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The Soviet theory of naval operational art is a body of knowledge which focuses
the tactical capabilities of the Soviet Navy on achieving the strategic missions
assigned them by the leadership of the Soviet Union. This body of knowledge
guides the creation and execution of Soviet naval operations. Soviet military science
establishes the theoretical foundation for the conduct of independent naval
operations. Soviet troop control creates the planning processes by which Soviet
naval commanders prepare for combat operations. Western analysis of the Soviet
Navy has long neglected the Soviet theory of naval operational art. As a result,
several unique characteristics of Soviet naval operations may be overlooked by
Western naval officers. This research has found that the Soviet naval planning
process is in many ways identical to that of the Soviet ground forces. This work also
attempts to explain the role of the independent naval operation in the Soviet view
of war. Finally, several analytical tools are suggested which may be employed to
explore Soviet views on the conduct of naval operations. The topic of Soviet naval
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I. INTRODUCTION
One thing must be clearly understood. If someone were to hand to an
American general, an English general, and a Soviet general the same set of
objectives facts and scientific data, with instructions that these facts and data
must be accepted as unimpeachable, and an analysis made and calculations
drawn on the basis of them, it is possible that the American and the
Englishman would reach similar conclusions--! don't know. But the Soviet
general would arrive at conclusions which would be radically different from
the other two. This is because, first of all, he begins from a completely
different set of basic premises and preconceived ideas, namely, the Marxian
concepts of the structure of society and the course of history. Second, the
logical process in his mind is totally unlike that of his Western counterparts,
because he uses Marxist dialectics, whereas they will use some form of
deductive reasoning. Third, a different set of moral laws governs and
restricts the behavior of the Soviet. Fourth, the Soviet general's aims will be
radically different from those of the American and the Englishman.
Col. Oleg Penkovskiy [Ref. 1]
Western analysis of the Soviet Navy has long avoided addressing the
concept of "operational art" in Soviet naval thought. Many articles describe
Soviet naval platforms and what tactics they are capable of. Strategic analysts,
following a natural desire to explain why the Soviets have constructed their
large navy, use these Soviet tactical characteristics to postulate potential roles
and missions of the Soviet Navy. The conclusions reached by these analysts can
be improved because the methodology they employ disregards a basic feature
of Soviet military thought. This missing feature-operational art-is the subject
of this thesis.
The Soviet military does not believe that tactics and strategy are directly
linked in today's combat environment. The result of a single tactical battle
cannot accomplish the tasks which a nation's strategy requires. The Soviets,
therefore, believe that several battles must be organized to complete a
strategic mission [Ref. 2]. How many battles will it take? Should these battles
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take place in succession or simultaneously? What forces should be used in each
battle? How can the effects of several battles be focused to achieve one
strategic mission? Soviet operational art attempts to answer these types of
questions.
The Soviet Navy fully participates in the study of operational art. Articles in
Morskoy Sbornik , a Soviet naval periodical, frequently address topics of
"operational" concern. Several naval articles will be used to examine the
differences between Soviet naval and ground combat. Based upon these
differences, the Soviet Navy has succeeded in developing a unique theory
within the framework of Soviet operational art.
Special emphasis is placed on investigating the form and content of Soviet
naval operations. The form of an operation describes the activities or patterns
which define the shape of an operation. The content is then determined by the
actions performed by the operation and the purposes behind these actions.
Through the use of examples, this work concludes by illustrating how a
knowledge of Soviet operational art could be used to better link Soviet naval
tactics to the strategic employment of the Soviet Navy.
A. THE NAVAL OPERATION IN SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT
1. Soviet Military Science
Soviet military science provides the theoretical and scientific basis for
the conduct of naval operations. Soviet Marxist- Leninist philosophy creates a
scientific structure based upon the belief that social and material development
proceeds in a deterministic fashion governed by unchanging laws. The Marxist
dialectic is used to describe how these social and material processes evolve
[Ref. 3]. Soviet military science uses the Marxist dialectic to examine these
objective laws, in particular the laws of armed conflict.
V. Savkin, in his book, Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics
,
describes how the laws of armed conflict govern the complex social
phenomenon of combat. [Ref. 4:p. 58] He explains that the laws of armed
conflict are statistical in nature. The law of radioactivity is an example of a
statistical law. The law of radioactivity cannot be used to predict when any one
decay will occur; however, the law of radioactivity can successfully predict the
total number of decays over a given period of time. The laws of armed conflict
operate in a like manner. The Soviets do not believe that the laws of armed
conflict can be used to predict the outcome of every combat action. They do
believe, though, that the aggregate outcome of a group of combat actions is
determined by the unchanging laws of armed conflict.
While the subject of Soviet military science may exist objectively, Soviet
military science itself is the subjective creation of Soviet military research and
thus subject to error. The Soviet Military Encyclopedia (SME) points out some
past failures of Soviet military science:
In the interwar period, Soviet military science developed actively and
creatively, focusing basic attention on an investigation into the nature of a
possible future war, the forms and methods for waging it, trends in the
development of the Armed Forces and the principles of military art... At the
same time, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military science had
not worked out fully enough the problems of the initial period of war, the
setting up and conducting of a strategic defense and a counter-offensive,
and the possibility of concealed attack had not been fully considered. [Ref.
5:p. 185]
For a period of years in the 1970s, the Soviet Navy had begun to use
the term "naval science." In the book, Soviet Naval Operations of the Great
Patriotic War 1941-1945
,
the preface begins "Naval science is a component of
Soviet military science, a branch of naval theory." [Ref. 6:p. ix] The SME
definition of Soviet military science, though, does not mention naval science
[Ref. 5:pp. 183-188]. Admiral Gorshkov in 1983 specifically avoided
acknowledging the existence of naval science [Ref. 7:pp. 27-38].
Soviet naval operations, therefore, must be studied within the
scientific structure built by military science. Accordingly, the terminology used
to describe Soviet naval operations carries the weight of scientific definitions.
While this initially might impede the progress of a student of the Soviet Navy,
once the definitions are learned, these standard terms allow for a more
detailed study of Soviet naval topics. The Soviet terms battle (boy) and combat
action (ooyevyye deystviya) both have unique scientific definitions. Even the
terms combat action {boyevyye deystviya) and military action (voyenyye
deystviya) have slightly different meanings. This research attempts to present
Soviet terms as they are portrayed in Soviet military articles. Consult the Soviet
Military Encyclopedia (SME) [Ref. 8] or Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (MED)
[Ref. 9] for more thorough, authoritative definitions.
One word of caution in reading translations of Soviet writings. The
Soviet word, deystviya, means action in the general sense of combat or military
action. The word, operatsiya, means operation in the sense of operational art.
These two words are often translated to the same English word "operation."
Only by consulting the original Russian or by thoroughly studying the context
of the article can one properly interpret the word "operation" in English
translations of Soviet writings.
A
C
2. Soviet Military Art
If military science is produced by scientists, then military art is
produced by engineers. Soviet military art is the theory and practice of
preparing for and executing military action. The theory of military art is a
product of Soviet military science [Ref. 10]. The practical result of this theory is
a set of principles upon which military action is based. Savkin writes, "The
principles of military art are the basic ideas and most important
recommendations for the organization and conduct of a battle, an operation,
or a war as a whole." [Ref. 4:p. 119] These principles apply the unchanging
laws of armed conflict to the contemporary combat environment. As a result,
the principles of military art change as the character of modern combat
changes. [Ref.4:pp. 119-121]
Soviet naval art studies the preparation and conduct of military action
by naval forces. [Ref. 11] While the study of military art is concerned with all
combat environments, naval art studies warfare in sea and ocean theaters.
Soviet naval art exists solely as a component of military art.
Soviet military art, and therefore naval art, divides its study of armed
conflict into the subjects of strategy, operational art and tactics.
a. Strategy
Marshal N. V. Ogarkov describes strategy as follows:
The theory of military strategy as a system of scientific knowledge
examines the conditions and the strategic nature of war, as well as the
methods for conducting war and strategic operations. Military strategy as a
practical activity is concerned with solving problems associated with defining
in concrete terms the strategic tasks for the armed forces and the resources
required to accomplish those tasks. Military strategy is also concerned with
developing and implementing measures to prepare the armed forces, the
theaters of military action, the economy and the population of the country
for war, and measures to plan for war and strategic operations; it is
concerned with planning armed forces deployment and leading them in
operations on a strategic scale, as well as with studying the capabilities of a
probable enemy to conduct war and strategic operations. [Ref . 1 2]
Ogarkov's definition introduces several terms which require explanation in
order to understand the Soviet concept of strategy.
Strategic goals are goals whose accomplishment will result in a
basic shift in the course of a war. General strategic goals are defined by the
political and military leadership of the Soviet Union to guide the conduct of the
entire war. The SME gives the following as examples of general strategic goals:
[Ref. 13]
- destruction of the enemy's armed forces;
- undermining of the enemy'seconomic potential;
- disruption of the enemy's political and military control; and
- occupation of enemy territory.
Each of these general strategic goals are subsequently broken down into
individual strategic goals. It is the individual strategic goals which directly
translate into strategic missions for Soviet forces.
The Soviet General Staff develops a plan based upon these goals
for each of the Theaters of Strategic Military Action (TSMA). This plan is called
the strategic operation. It assigns missions directly to fleet and front size
military formations within the theater. The Main Navy Staff, as an adjunct to
the General Staff, is responsible for preparing the naval sections of the strategic
plans. [Ref. 14:pp. 283-289]
The Soviet General Staff uses two different methods to ensure
that their strategic operations are carried out by naval fleets. First, the Main
Navy Staff may exercise control for the General Staff. In that case, the General
Staff would then send a representative to the theater to monitor the actions of
the fleet commander. These representatives act like "crisis managers" solving
problems which develop as the combat situation changes. This appears to be
the current method of control for the Soviet Northern Fleet. [Ref. 14:pp. 285-
287]
In continental TSMAs, due to the number of forces involved and
the complexity of the strategic plan, the General Staff representative is given a
staff and a headquarters to work out of. These theater commanders control
the actions of the fronts and fleets subordinate to them in order to execute the
strategic operation. The Soviet Baltic, Black and Pacific Fleets operate under
the control of theater commanders. [Ref. 14:p. 287] These strategic
relationships are diagramed in Figure 1.
The Soviet ballistic submarine force (SSBNs) appears to be
excluded from these standard methods of control. The range and power of
submarine-launched ballistic missiles enable Soviet SSBNs to accomplish
strategic missions by themselves. As a member of the Strategic Nuclear Forces.
SSBNs do not participate in strategic operations. Instead, SSBN missions are
organized by the General Staff and coordinated with the Strategic Rocket
Forces and Long-Range Aviation to achieve a strategic strike. [Ref. 14:pp. 288-
289]
b. Operational Art
Operational art is the theory and practice of preparing and
executing operations by formations of the Soviet Armed Services [Ref. 15]. In
practical terms, operational art implements the strategic operation by planning


































Fleets* - Normal planning and coordination of naval fleets plus control of Northern
Fleet units not controlled by Strategic Nuclear Forces
SHC -Supreme High Command
HCOF - High Command of Forces
Figure 1 . Command Subordination of Soviet Forces in Wartime
[Adapted from Ref. 14:p. 287]
missions. Naval operational art guides naval operational formations in
accomplishing strategic missions.
The operational formation, ob'yedineniye, is formed to execute
military operations [Ref. 16]. The smallest type, operational-tactical
ob'yedineniye, is the basic building block of larger formations. Although the
MED does not provide a naval example of an operational-tactical
ob'yedineniye, a naval grouping called diviziya is a likely candidate. [Ref. 17] A
diviziya is made up of either surface ships or submarines. A surface ship diviziya
is composed of either several 1st Rank warships or several brigades of smaller
warships of various types. (Moskva class cruisers, guided missile cruisers and
nuclear powered submarines are 1st Rank warships.) A submarine diviziya
either contains several submarine brigades or is directly composed of various
nuclear or diesel submarines.
A second operational force grouping, operational ob'yedineniye,
is the formation most often tasked with the accomplishment of operational
missions. These operational missions, such as the destruction of an enemy
carrier, assigns a task to be accomplished within a specified time period. The
MED describes flotillas, squadrons and fleet naval air arms as examples of naval
operational ob'yedineniye. [Ref. 16]
The largest operational force grouping is the operational-strategic
ob'yedineniye. Naval fleets as operational-strategic ob'yedineniye are the
largest operational formations which currently exist in the Soviet Navy. [Ref.
16] The activities of the fleet commander and his staff are a main focus of this
study of naval operational art. This hierarchy of Soviet operational formations
is shown in Figure 2.
Designation Naval Force
Operational-strategic ob'yedineniye naval fleet
Operational ob'yedineniye flotilla, squadron, fleet air arm
Operational-tactical ob'yedineniye diviziya of ships or submarines
Figure 2. Soviet Naval Operational Formations
The Soviet Navy is capable of executing either of two basic types of
operations defined by operational art. The independent operation
(samostoyatel'naya operatsiya) is capable of being conducted by a single
branch of the Soviet armed forces. The MED lists only certain air, anti-air and
some naval operations as potential independent operations, conspicuously
neglecting both Soviet ground operations and the strategic strike of the
Strategic Rocket Forces. [Ref. 18] The MED lists the following as independent
naval operations (morskoya operatsiya): [Ref. 19]
- Disruption of enemy sea lines of communication (SLOC);
- Defense of naval basing areas and SLOCs;
- Destruction of enemy naval forces in enclosed seas and coastal waters;
- Destruction of enemy land installations;
- Destruction of enemy carrier forces;
- Destruction of enemy ASW forces; and
- Destruction of enemy missile submarines.
In addition to these independent operations, the Soviet Navy can
participate in combined operations (sovmestnaya operatsiya). [Ref. 20] These
combined operations are conducted by operational and tactical formations of
various branches of the Soviet armed forces. The branch of service which has
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the most important role in the operation will command the operation. The
Soviet Navy can participate in several types of combined operations:
- Amphibious landing, usually commanded by a ground force combined
arms commander but sometimes placed under control of a naval flotilla or
squadron commander [Ref. 21];
- Anti-landing defense operation, always commanded by a ground force
commander [Ref. 22]; and
- Air defense operation, commanded by an air defense force (PVO)
commander [Ref. 23].
The more complex topic of combined-arms/combined-fleet
operations is discussed in Chapter V.
c. Tactics
Soviet tactics is the theory and practice of preparing and executing
a battle. The Russian word which translates into battle is boy. The word, boy, is
also the root word for the Russian word for combat. In the Russian language,
therefore, battle embodies both the essence of combat and tactics.
In the Soviet view, battle unites the tactical actions of fire, strike
and maneuver into a single block of space and time [Ref. 24]. The battle is
limited in time because, in a matter of hours, opposing forces will no longer be
able to fight. One side or the other must disengage or surrender. The limits of
combat exhaustion are determined by factors such as the size of weapons
magazines or by the amount of damage a combat unit can endure. The Soviet
concept of battle, therefore, has a distinct beginning and end. The battle is
limited in scope to the opposing combat elements that are actually engaging in
combat. The breadth of modern battle has grown with the introduction of
weapons of greater range, accuracy and firepower.
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Former Commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, Fleet Admiral S. G.
Gorshkov, examines the concept of naval battle in his book, The Sea Power of
the State . Gorshkov describes a naval battle as a clash in space and time
between the offensive and defensive capabilities of opposing naval forces: As
naval offensive weapons improve, as examples he mentions torpedoes and
missiles, naval fleets must devote increasing energy and attention to destroying
approaching weapons rather than eliminating the attacking enemy naval
formations. [Ref. 25]
The offensive-defensive balance strongly influences the character
of a naval battle according to Gorshkov. When the defensive measures of the
enemy naval groupings are strong, attacking naval forces must bring diverse
naval forces to bear on the enemy defenses. The coordination of torpedoes,
sub-launched and air-launched missiles would constitute employment of
diverse naval forces. Alternatively, when offensive naval weapons dominate
the sea, the naval battle may be carried out by homogeneous forces (a Soviet
expression meaning aircraft and submarines) launching their superior
weapons. [Ref. 25]
B. THE NAVAL OPERATION IN SOVIET POLITICAL THOUGHT
Soviet military doctrine strictly subordinates an otherwise apolitical
military science to the firm control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU). Soviet military doctrine answers questions which are beyond the realm
of pure military science. Declarations on the likely nature of a future war are
perhaps the most important of Soviet doctrinal questions. Why is this question
beyond the realm of Soviet military science?
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Military doctrine is developed and applied in the Soviet Union for a specific
period of time. This doctrine is revealed in two forms, political and military-
technical. As is so often quoted, Lenin restated for the CPSU the Clauswitzian
proclamation that war is a continuation of politics by more violent means.
Military science cannot participate in the determination of political goals. The
political aspect of military doctrine exists to provide an acceptable linkage
between the political goals and the strategic goals of the Soviet Union in any
potential conflict. [Ref. 26]
The military-technical aspect of doctrine concerns itself with determining
the methods of waging war, military development and the preparation of the
armed forces. Certainly these decisions depend to some extent on capabilities
as defined by Soviet military science, but both the political and military-
technical aspects of military doctrine direct the study of military science
towards the most pressing problems of the Soviet nation as defined by the
CPSU [Ref. 26]
For many years now Soviet military doctrine has stated that nuclear war is
not inevitable, and that if war does begin there may be a prolonged
conventional phase. The accuracy of these statements remains in doubt
because, fortunately, the CPSU has never tried to conduct a nuclear war. One
theme in particular, though, seems to resonate through the Soviet military
structure. A future conventional war may at any time escalate to use of nuclear
weapons. The implications of this assumption on the planning of Soviet naval
operations will become clear in subsequent discussions. One might conclude
that this implies a conceptual firebreak between conventional and nuclear
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weapon use. Does the nuclear firebreak operate identically both on land and
at sea? This question remains largely unanswered.
C. SUMMARY
In order to better conceptualize the meanings of Soviet strategy, strategic
operation, operational art and tactics, think of the word operation as implying
the existence of a written plan. Strategy is the delineation of the goals to be
achieved in war, and strategic operations are the written plans for achieving
those goals. Tactics is the actual combat of the war, but what is left for
operational art?
Operational art is the Soviet military skill of preparing and executing a plan
in pursuit of strategic goals. This plan neither defines the goals nor the tactics
needed for combat. It exists as a link between Soviet strategy and tactics. The
Soviet operational plan organizes tactical actions. It provides the cohesion
necessary to ensure that battles are not fought in vain, but instead culminate in
the achievement of a strategic goal.
This study chooses to focus on naval operational art for two reasons. First,
strategies can be created and destroyed by the political and military leadership
of the Soviet Union. A study of Soviet strategic concepts always labors under
the question of whether or not the Soviet will execute their current strategy or
create a new one. In addition, strategies rarely fit the actual circumstances
which bring a nation to war and nearly always need modification.
The two remaining topics, naval operational art and tactics, are somewhat
less mercurial. Soviet naval tactics are firmly linked to actual weapons system
capabilities and Soviet naval training programs. These cannot be changed as
capriciously as strategy can. In peacetime, tactics change at a rather steady rate
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while in wartime, combat experience greatly accelerates the development of
tactics. A study of Soviet tactics should prove valuable for at least the
beginning of a potential future conflict.
Naval operational art is the subject of this study because it is being
neglected while the study of Soviet strategy and naval tactics proceeds.
Because naval operational art is conceptually anchored in Soviet naval tactics, it
should prove as worthy a field of study as tactics has. This thesis hopes to
further discussion on just what is Soviet naval operational art.
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II. THEORETICAL BASIS OF SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONAL ART
The theoretical basis of Soviet naval operational art is inextricably linked to
the Soviet's view of armed conflict as a single, unified whole. The operational
level of combat cannot be studied in isolation from the strategies and tactics of
war. Instead, Soviet military art has produced a list of general principles to
guide the conduct of strategy, operational art and tactics. These principles, as
listed in the SME, are: [Ref. 27]
- High combat readiness must be maintained regardless of the conditions
under which a war may start or be conducted.
- Probability of success is enhanced by surprise, decisive and aggressive
combat action and a continuous striving to gain and retain the initiative.
- Complete utilization of all military capabilities and assets are required to
achieve victory.
- Successful combat action depends upon coordinated use and cooperation
of operational (tactical) formations.
- Decisive concentration of primary combat efforts at the necessary moment
and in important directions is required to complete the combat mission.
- Successful combat action is characterized by simultaneous defeat of enemy
formations to the full depth of their construction. Timely, intensive and
bold maneuver is required in order to achieve a high rate of destruction
within a short amount of time.
- Calculation and complete utilization of moral-political factors must be
made.
- Firm and continuous troop control must be maintained.
- There must be uncompromising resolution of problems in the execution of
mission, initiative.
- Complete support must be maintained for combat action.




This chapter describes how these general principles are refined into
operational principles for use by the Soviet Navy. This process of refinement
may be thought of as occurring in stages. First, the general principles of
military art are listed and defined. Second, each general principle is applied to
the conduct of operations. Third, the operational contents of each principle
are examined in the context of the naval combat environment. The Soviet
theory of naval operational art derives from the application of the general
principles of military art in the preparation and execution of naval operations.
This methodology for constructing the Soviet theory of naval operational
art is based upon the following evidence. Some citations in the SME define a
principle first with a general description and then in some combination of
strategic, operational and tactical terminology. For example, the SME citation
on coordination {vzaimodeystviye) describes the general concept of
coordinated use of combat groupings. [Ref. 28] The SME then proceeds to
define tactical, operational and strategic coordination. The same is true for the
SME citation on surprise (vnezapnost 1). Other citations, such as troop control,
combat support and massing of forces and means are described primarily in
operational and tactical terms. These definitions take great care to explain the
application of each principle to the levels of military art.
Further evidence is suggested by Vice Admiral K. Stalbo's articles from the
now labeled Stalbo-Chernavin debate in Morskoy Sbornik . In the opening
article of the debate, "Some Issues on the Theory of the Development and
Employment of the Navy," Stalbo lists eight "specific features inherent to naval
warfare." [Ref. 29:p. 24]
- Offensive actions at sea against enemy combatants do not attempt to
capture geographical objects. Exceptionsarejomtand amphibiousactions.
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- Defensive actions by formations of ships are not always required to hold
geographical objects.
- Objectives are achieved in naval battles by concentrating combat efforts on
the most heavily defended targets. (Stalbo uses the example of WWII naval
actions against aircraft carriers.) Naval combat actions depend upon
gaining command of the sea.
- The deployment of naval combatants to their designated areas for
conducting combat action may take from several weeks to a month to
complete-even for a tactical action.
- The scope of contemporary operations at sea may be global, especially in
the employment of strategic missiles.
- As opposed to the other Soviet Armed Services, the Soviet Navy conducts
battle and operations in four separate media, (i.e., on the ocean, under the
ocean, in the air and on the land)
- Fleets employ diverse weapons (ballistic missiles, aircraft, air defense
weapons, naval infantry, engineer and signal troops) which, along with
ships, provide for broad capabilities in the contemporary combat
environment.
- Some naval forces (amphibious assault forces, carrier aircraft, etc.) are
limited in their abilities by weather.
Several of Stalbo's statements were attacked by the Soviet officer destined
to succeed Gorshkov as the CinC of the Soviet Navy. Admiral Chernavin, then
Chief of the Main Navy Staff, expressed his concern that Stalbo had
overemphasized the unique and independent aspects of the Soviet Navy to the
detriment of a unified Soviet military strategy. Stalbo had even developed a list
of principles of military art similar to the list provided here from the MED.
Chernavin specifically criticized Stalbo's inaccurate characterization of two
principles. [Ref. 30:pp. 20-4]
While the Stalbo articles have certainly been faulted by several Soviet naval
authors, his list of "specific features inherent in naval warfare" seems to have
been vindicated. In a 1986 article by Admiral P. Navoytsev, then First Deputy
Chief of the Main Navy Staff, two of the "specific features" noted by Stalbo
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resurface. Navoytsev repeats that naval combat action occurs in four media
and that independent naval operations usually do not pursue a geographical
objective. [Ref. 31 :p. 19]
The question of how to use these "specific features" is made clear by
Admiral V. Sysoyev's contribution to the Stalbo- Chernavin debate. [Ref. 32:pp.
21-27] Sysoyev explains that these features of naval warfare are to be
combined with the general principles of military art. He uses the example of
conducting a naval battle to destroy a heavily defended target. The concept of
attacking the defended target is combined with the general principle of
concentrating combat effort to achieve superiority over the enemy. The correct
naval action is to attack the defended target via the axis with the weakest
defense. This maximizes the superiority of the attacking forces over the enemy
defense.
This three stage methodology used here to develop the theory of naval
operations may be too crude for a Soviet naval officer with a doctorate in
military science. For example, no attempt is made to identify principles which
may apply to each of the combat arms of the Soviet Navy. But from the point of
view of a Western naval officer studying Soviet Naval operational art, the
following discussion provides a basic framework for understanding Soviet naval
operational theory.
A. PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY ART IN NAVAL OPERATIONS
1. High combat readiness must be maintained regardless of the
conditions under which a war may start.
Combat readiness (boyevaya gotovnost') is a measure of the
preparedness of combat forces to accomplish assigned missions. [Ref. 33] In
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peacetime, combat readiness measures the ability of combat forces to mobilize
from a peacetime to a wartime posture. For that reason, an important
requirement for Soviet combat readiness is the ability to repel an enemy
surprise attack. (Possibly a lesson learned from World War II.)
In wartime, combat readiness measures the essential combat capacity
of combat troops. Various indicators, such as numerical strength, availability of
materiel and personnel training, are related to the nature and intensity of
combat action to determine a formation's combat capacity. [Ref . 33]
A critical measure of Soviet combat capacity is the ability to survive a
nuclear attack. According to Soviet norms, a combat formation's capacity to
fight is severely degraded when 50 to 60 percent of its personnel and
equipment are no longer functioning but control is retained. If control is lost,
the formation is considered to have no capacity to fight. Nuclear weapons
threaten to rapidly reduce a nation's combat capacity. [Ref. 33]
No unique operational or naval aspects appear in Soviet discussions of
combat readiness. Admiral K. Makarov (current Chief of the Main Navy Staff)
merely echoes the SME definition of combat readiness:
Under contemporary conditions "combat readiness of naval forces" means
their ability in any situation to begin combat operations in an organized
fashion and carry out their assigned missions to repulse attacks and smash
the aggressor's naval forces in set time periods. [Ref. 34:p. 18]
Admiral Chernavin in 1982 [Ref. 30:p. 24] and again in 1986 [Ref.
35:pp. 26-33] also stresses the importance of combat readiness. The most
stressed element of combat readiness is the time factor. Makarov explains that
modern weapons have increased the complexity of maintaining combat
readiness while at the same time reducing the time available for this
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maintenance to take place. [Ref. 34:p. 19] The time pressure felt by Soviet
naval staffs must be exacerbated by the need to deploy naval forces early due
to relatively long transit times. Time is especially critical if Soviet naval action is
to begin concurrent with Soviet ground action.
2. Probability of success is enhanced by surprise, decisive and aggressive
combat action and a continuous striving to gain and retain the
initiative.
Surprise, decisiveness, aggressiveness and initiative are the operative
words in this principle. Surprise (vnezapnost 1) is created by employing actions
which the enemy does not anticipate. By judiciously choosing the time and
method of attack, it is possible to catch the enemy off guard and in effect,
paralyze hisability to fight. [Ref. 36:p. 161]
Operational surprise is achieved through choices made in organizing
and executing an operation: [Ref. 36:p. 162]
- secretive preparations;
- anticipating enemy deployments;
- unexpectedly commencing the operation;
- attacking the enemy in unexpected sectors;
- continually striving to vary the conduct of operations and employ new
weapons;
- unexpectedly counterattacking the enemy; and
- properly choosing the time to prepare a counterattack.
The SME remarks that these operational measures create a temporary
condition of surprise which then must be exploited by the operational
commander.
Captain 1st Rank Anstov examines the use of surprise at sea in a 1985
Morskoy Sbornik article. Aristov repeats the definition of surprise from the
21
SME and cites many of the same measures for achieving surprise. Perhaps
again, because of the extended deployment times anticipated for Soviet naval
operations, Aristov draws attention to the fact that naval surprise is heavily
dependent upon the employment of electronic warfare and reconnaissance
forces. He points out the importance of reconnaissance in properly assessing
the situation and recommends the employment of electronic warfare to
neutralize the enemy's reconnaissance means. [Ref. 37] The SME also
acknowledges that electronics can detect the approach of naval forces (as well
as other forces); therefore, in order to achieve surprise, friendly forces must be
masked and enemy reconnaissance disrupted. [Ref. 36:pp. 161-3]
Combat activeness (boyevaya activnost") is the Soviet term which
incorporates aggressive and decisive combat action. Forces exhibiting combat
activeness exert maximum effort in completing their combat missions.
Activeness is less a description of combat than it is a psychological characteristic
of the fighting man. Troops with courage, creativity and a constant readiness
to engage the enemy naturally display combat activeness. [Ref. 38]
Admiral Navoytsev uses historical analogy to illustrate the military
significance of bold action. In the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), the Baltic
Fleet submarine force was bottled up in the ports of Kronshtadt and Leningrad
by the Axis forces. According to Navoytsev, through bold and daring action,
submarines were able to penetrate enemy ASW barriers and attack German
SLOCs. Navoytsev claims that the results of these attacks significantly affected
the course of the war. [Ref. 31 :p. 22] Perhaps because this principle describes a
psychological condition, neither the SME nor Navoytsev discuss any specific
operational or naval aspect of combat activeness.
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The Soviet concept of initiative (Initsiativa) is quite complex and subtly
different from generally accepted Western definitions. In the context of
planning and executing operations, initiative describes the ability of the Soviet
commander to complete combat tasks in the face of a changing combat
situation with the purpose of imposing his will upon the enemy [Ref. 39]. This
type of initiative is generally described as seizing or gaining the initiative which
disrupts the actions of the enemy. Stalbo notes that seizing the initiative by
concentrating overwhelming forces allows the commander to choose the place
and time of the attack [Ref. 40].
Soviet initiative as it applies to the actions of combat personnel is of
such significance in modern combat, that it has become a principle of military
art in and of itself. The principle of initiative is later described in this chapter as
the ninth general principle of military art.
3. Complete utilization of all military capabilities and assets are required
to achieve victory
-
Combat capabilities (boyevyye vozmozhnosti) are the quantitative and
qualitative measures of a combat force's ability to complete a specific mission
within a given amount of time. Combat capabilities are variable qualities based
upon the changing combat situation. The commander of a combined-arms
operational formation bases his decision upon the measured combat
capabilities of tactical formations under his command. In the Soviet Navy, this
implies that the fleet commander directly monitors the combat capabilities of
naval tactical forces. [Ref. 41]
The combat capabilities of an attacking ground force formation is
summed up by describing the geographical width and depth of front which the
formation can capture. Soviet naval actions do not pursue geographical
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objectives. Accordingly, a Soviet naval formation's capability is measured by:
[Ref. 41]
- the probability of damage to enemy ships, aircraft, etc;
- the expected number of targets damaged to the degree specified; and
- the formation's reliability in combat.
4. Successful combat action depends upon coordinated use and
cooperation of operational (tactical) formations.
Coordination (vzaimodeystviye) is the organization of actions by
various combat forces in terms of missions, area and time within a common
battle or operation. Coordination is most important in battles or operations
whose success depends upon the joint action of various combat forces. [Ref.
28:p. 123]
Operational coordination is the organization of the combat missions
of operational and tactical formations by objective, place and time in an
operation conducted in an operational sector. This organization is established
by the operational commander. [Ref. 28:pp. 123-4]
While coordination is the organization of subordinate force missions,
Rear Admiral Yu. Bystrov (Deputy Chief of the Main Navy Staff) explains that
cooperation is the system of interconnected actions organized by these
subordinate formations "among themselves" as shown in Figure 3. [Ref. 42:p.
25]
The organization of coordination and cooperation is necessary to
maximize the combat effort achieved by diverse naval forces. The combat
capacity of forces vary. This principle explains that these forces should be





















:igure 3. Coordination and Cooperation
forces. In this way, the Soviets believe that they derive maximum efficiency
from their forces. [Ref. 42:p. 24]
Bystrov provides a particularly good example of how to coordinate
strikes of Soviet submarines and aircraft. The enemy groupings anti-air defense
(AAW) and antisubmarine defense (ASW) are first compared. If the enemy's
AAW defense is stronger, then Soviet submarines should attack first thereby
"creating favorable conditions" for the subsequent air attack. If the enemy's
ASW defense is stronger, then Soviet aircraft should attack first. [Ref. 42: p. 25]
The coordination of naval action is affected by several specific naval
features. The conduct of naval action in four media combined and the effects
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of weather on naval sensors (reconnaissance, communications, etc.) combine to
greatly complicate the maintenance of coordination at sea. Navoytsev notes
that, with modern technological means (including spaceborne systems), the
creation of controllable submarine tactical formations is only now becoming
feasible. [Ref. 31:pp. 22-3] Navoytsev's comments demonstrate the Soviet
desire to increase the capability of their submarines to communicate with each
other and with other platforms in order to enhance coordination.
The principle of coordination and cooperation also reveals the
significance of why Stalbo listed the diversity of naval forces as a specific
feature of naval action. It is the diversity its forces that enables the Soviet Navy
to conduct independent naval operations. On the other hand, to the extent
that the Soviet military leadership sees a need for independent naval
operations, the Soviet Navy will be supplied with requisite forces. Remember
Gorshkov's description of naval battle, coordination of diverse forces can
overcome stiff enemy defense.
5. Decisive concentration of primary combat efforts at the necessary
moment and in important directions is required to complete the
combat mission.
The massing of forces and means (massirovaniye sil i sredstv)
concentrates the efforts of combat forces in order to rout the enemy and
achieve the goal of the combat or operation. [Ref. 43:p. 179] The objective of
the operation or battle is twofold: the destruction of the enemy and the
attainment of some goal. The SME definition of combat mission explains that
the objective of an operation or battle is generally the "destruction
(annihilation) of the enemy's main forces in a specified area to a prescribed
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depth and the seizing of a designated position or area." [Ref. 44] These
definitions apply to combat in a continental theater.
A specific feature of naval action is that it does not generally pursue
the attainment of some geographic objective. Only in defensive naval actions
(i.e., defense of naval bases and SLOCs) is the naval operation tied to land
objectives. This principle is therefore altered as it is applied to naval action.
This distinction is tacitly acknowledged in the SME. In describing naval
action in a combined amphibious operation, the massing of naval forces is used
to support the attainment of objectives ashore. In independent naval
operations, the objective of naval action is described as devoid of geographical
content. The sole purpose of independent naval action is the destruction of the
most important enemy ship groupings. [Ref. 43:p. 180]
6. Simultaneous defeat of enemy formations to the full depth of their
construction. Timely, intensive and bold maneuver in order to achieve
a high rate of destruction within a short period of time~
In the Soviet theory of combined-arms combat, the achievement of
depth in combat action is accomplished through the maneuver of resources,
nuclear strikes and fire. In the 1984 edition of V. G. Reznichenko's book,
Tactics
,
maneuver isdescribed as making it possible to: [Ref. 45:p. 49]
- seize and retain the initiative;
- disrupt the enemy's plan;
- conduct combat in a changing situation;
- complete the objectives of a battle in less time with fewer loses; and
- defeat a superior enemy in detail.
Operational maneuver is ordered by the operational commander for
the purpose of completing assigned combat missions. Operational maneuver
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includes the retargeting of air and missile strikes and the redistribution of
logistical elements. Naval forces are maneuvered by directing and redirecting
naval tactical formations in the course of carrying out missions along various
operational axes. [Ref. 46]
Both Stalbo and Sysoyev make reference to deep maneuver in naval
action. Stalbo describes deep maneuver as striking the enemy formation to the
full depth of its deployment. [Ref. 40:p. 17] Sysoyev, in referring to the
development of military theory between the world wars, explains that naval
forces learned to destroy enemy formations to their full depth in combined
operations. He states that the concentration of effort, deep maneuver and
simultaneous destruction in depth have become "guiding principles in defining
the content of the naval operation." [Ref. 47:p. 27]
In order to visualize how a Soviet naval commander might employ this
principle in an independent naval operation, consider a possible Soviet plan to
disrupt NATO SLOCs. From the Soviet point of view, the depth of the SLOC
would extend from the ports on the U.S. Eastern seaboard to facilities along the
European Atlantic coastline. A Soviet operation in depth, therefore, might
include disruption of U.S. port facilities by Soviet submarine launched cruise
missile attacks, disruption of NATO convoys by Soviet submarines and ground
launched missile attacks on NATO ports.
Deep maneuver becomes more important in the destruction of time
urgent targets. An operation to destroy an approaching U.S. carrier battle
group might include the simultaneous launch of air and submarine missile
attacks while torpedo attacks are attempted inside the battle groups defensive
2
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screen. The coordination of attacks in depth is expected to disrupt the carrier
battle group defenses just when they are needed most.
7. Calculation and complete utilization of moral-political factors.
Moral-political factors (faktor moral 'no-politicheskiy) are defined as
follows in the 1973 edition of Military Pedagogy , a Soviet military textbook:
Moral-political traits define the moral-political orientation of the
individual and the moral character traits of the soldier-that is, his outlook,
ideals, socially useful interests, moral-political feelings, a sense of duty, Soviet
patriotism, hatred of the enemy, feelings of proletarian internationalism and
personal responsibility for defending the Homeland and the achievements of
socialism, a sense of honor, collectivism, mutual aid, and so on. [Ref. 48]
The Soviet commander carries great responsibility for the moral-
political state of his troops. Reznichenko provides the following prescription
for his readers: [Ref. 45:p. 51]
- know the moral-political state of the troops and work aggressively to
reinforce that state.
- study the moral-political qualities of the enemy. Discover both his strong
and weak points and work aggressively to counteract enemy propaganda.
- Exert an ideological and psychological influence upon the enemy.
This principle is also listed by Stalbo in his opening articles of the
Stalbo-Chernavin debate but he provides no discussion of it content. Moral-
political factors, while frequently mentioned in Soviet naval articles, appear to
have no particular operational or naval content.
8. Firm and continuous troop control must be maintained.
Troop control (upravleniye voyskami) is the set of activities carried out
by the organs of leadership (commanders, staffs, political organs, etc.) to
prepare and execute combat action. The process of troop control regulates:
[Ref. 49]
- continuous collection, display and analysis of situational data;
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- decision-making;
- determination of the missions of subordinate forces;
- detailed operational planning;
- organization of support of combat action;
- the training of forces and staffs;
- the organization of political work; and
- monitoring and assisting subordinate forces.
The process of troop control is perhaps the single most influential
principle in the conduct of Soviet naval operations. Troop control focuses on
the activities of the operational commander. As such, it determines the form of
naval operations while the other principles influence their content. Soviet
troop control does not appear to contain any special features when employed
by the Soviet Navy. In fact, a common planning and control system greatly
enhances the Soviet Union's ability to integrate the actions of its five armed
services.
9. There must be uncompromising resolution of problems in the
execution of missions, initiative.
The SME states, "The demonstration of initiative is one of the most
important conditions of successful action." [Ref. 39] Demonstration of
initiative in the Soviet military starts with the readiness of individuals to take
responsibility for their independent decisions. As stated earlier, initiative can
mean the striving to find the best means possible for fulfilling assigned tasks.
But in the context of resolving problems, initiative takes on new meaning.
The combat situation, at sea or on land, can change rapidly in a
modern conflict. The Soviets feel that problems will develop because of the
highly dynamic nature of warfare and the increasing vulnerability of
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communications to enemy attack. Commanders must demonstrate initiative in
combat when the plan being executed no longer corresponds with the actual
situation. In particular, there may be no time or possibility of receiving new
orders from higher authority. When this situation occurs, the battlefield
commander is expected to assume responsibility for the problem and take
action.
The Soviet Navy reinforces the need for initiative with historical
examples in books and articles. For example, at midnight on September 22,
1941, a detachment of landing craft were supposed to join with a main assault
force for a Soviet landing at Grigoryevka in the Black Sea. An attack by German
bombers destroyed many important planning documentsand injured several of
the senior naval officers involved. In the resulting disruption of the plan, the
landing craft were delayed almost three hours in reaching the main body of the
assault force. Rear Admiral Gorshkov, using his own initiative, commenced the
landing with small boats and rowboats:
The landing of a tactical assault force at Grigoryevka undoubtedly deserves
favorable marks, in both its conception and execution, for facilitating
achievement of its objective. The success of the landing and the landing
operations ashore was to the greatest extent governed by the timely
initiative of Rear Admiral Gorshkov in beginning the landing on ship's
launches without waiting for the landing craft detachment, and by the
synchronized operations of rifle divisions advancing on the front and the
landing force. [Ref. 6:pp. 100-101]
It is important to recognize the theoretical limits of Soviet initiative. A
Soviet commander may use initiative in a changing situation to ensure that his
combat mission is completed. The commander's individual decision, though,
may not change the objectives, time and place of his assigned combat mission.
Is this different from initiative in the U.S. military?
31
At the tactical level of combat, both Soviet and U.S. commanders are
expected to accomplish their assigned combat missions. The Soviet tactical
commander is assigned a mission with a designated target, time and place. The
Soviet tactical commander's basic plan of attack is generally approved by his
senior commander in advance. The Soviet tactical commander demonstrates
initiative only when a changing situation warrants it. A U.S. tactical
commander generally receives a combat mission which designates target, place
and a time period for mission accomplishment. The U.S. commander is trained
to execute his mission based upon his own judgment of the situation. As a
result, the U.S. commander will employ his initiative much more frequently
than his Soviet counterpart.
This same phenomena is magnified at the operational level of combat.
Soviet operational commanders and their U.S. counterparts by rank assume
responsibility for large groups of forces. Soviet fleet commanders are
particularly well positioned to exercise initiative in as much as they work closely
with a representative of the General Staff who may approve changes in
operational plans. But for the same reason as cited before, U.S. naval
commanders will tend to display initiative much more frequently than their
Soviet counterparts.
10. Complete support must be maintained for combat action.
Support of combat action (obespecheniye boyevykh deystviy) is carried
out by a system of combat or operational support, rear support, special support
and technical support. The distinction between combat and operational
support is based upon the scale of combat action. Combat support assists in the
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preparation and execution of battles while operational support prepares
operations. [Ref. 50]
There are several types of combat (operational) support common to
the Soviet armed services. Reconnaissance, defense against weapons of mass
destruction, radioelectronic combat, deception, engineer support and security
measures are widely employed. Several types of combat (operational) support
are employed exclusively by the Soviet Navy:
- Air defense of naval forces, a set of measures which organize the actions of
antiaircraft weapons on ships and naval bases and naval fighter aviation
coordinated with National and Army air defense forces to protect naval
forces at sea and in base against enemy air strikes [Ref. 51];
- Antisubmarine (ASW) support, a set of measures which organize the
actions of both stationary and maneuverable ASW forces in protection of
naval bases, naval formations, amphibious detachments and key straits or
narrows [Ref. 52];
- Antimine support, a set of measures which organize the surveillance and
reporting of detected mines in naval basing areas and zones of operations,
the sweeping and destruction of mines, the piloting of ships behind
minesweepers and the avoidance of mines in order to protect naval
warships and transports from mine damage [Ref 53]; and
- Antiboat defense, a set of measures which the surveillance and warning
necessary to destroy enemy small combatants before they can damage
naval bases of transiting formations of ships [Ref. 54].
Rear support is a system of logistic and specialized technical support
organized by Rear Services of the Soviet Armed Forces, a branch of the Soviet
armed services. Logistic supply, airfield engineering and medical support are
examples of rear support activities. [Ref. 50]
Special support activities evaluate terrain and geodetic data and
prepare detailed topographical charts for combat units (topogeodesic support).
[Ref. 50] Navigation-hydrographical and hydrometeorlogical support is
specifically organized in the Soviet Navy to provide fleet forces with necessary
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situational information, equip ships with navigation, oceanographic and
hydrometeorological equipment in order to deploy a system of navigational
facilities in oceanic theaters. These support systems both enhance the
navigational safety of Soviet naval actions but increase the weapons
effectiveness of fleet units. [Ref. 55:pp. 21-22]
Technical support is organized to maintain the operability of Soviet
military equipment. Each branch of the Soviet Armed Forces uses rocket
engineering, electronics engineering, artillery engineering, motor engineering
and others. In addition to these common technical support measures, the
Soviet Navy is free to organize the technical support necessary to maintain
naval equipment. [Ref. 50]
Chernavin specifically emphasized reconnaissance and radioelectronic
combat as crucial support measures for the Soviet Navy. It is reconnaissance
which collects the information vital to the preparation and execution of
operations. Chernavin expresses the belief that the importance of naval
reconnaissance is growing. First, because of the expanding scope of naval
operations, but also because of the dynamic nature of warfare at sea. He
states, "One cannot dispute the opinion of many military theoreticians that the
main thing that will have to be organized in combat in the future will be the
battle for information." [Ref. 55:pp. 16-7]
Captain 1st rank A. Alkhimenko describes the important elements of
the operational organization of support for naval action. Alkhimenko defines
operational organization as a system of static and mobile facilities echeloned in
depth. Alkhimenko's main theme is that facilities such as naval bases, airfields,
reconnaissance and communications stations and logistical bases need to be
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deployed as close to important combat areas as political and geographic
constraints allow. [Ref. 56]
Alkhimenko emphasizes three important features of any naval basing
system. First, mobile facilities are more valuable than static facilities because of
their reduced vulnerability to nuclear attack; nevertheless, he notes that static
shore bases still represent the foundation of the the Soviet naval basing
structure. Second, islands are increasingly important in the operational
organization of support. They occupy advantageous military and geographical
positions and shorten lines of communication between basing facilities and
areas of combat. Third, forward air basing is particularly important for the
successful accomplishment of independent naval operations. They provide the
necessary basing for Soviet naval aviation to operate in forward ASW areas,
counter enemy ASW barriers, provide reconnaissance and participate in control
ofSLOCs. [Ref. 56]
1 1. Timely restoration of reserves and maintenance of combat
effectiveness.
Combat effectiveness (boyevaya effektivnost') refers not to the
abilities of combat troops but instead to the effectiveness of combat
equipment. Combat effectiveness is a characteristic of weaponry which
measures the amount of damage inflicted on enemy targets within fixed
periods of time with fixed amounts of material. This measurement serves as the
basis for determining combat capability in the planning of operations. Combat
effectiveness is estimated according to established formulas, tables and graphs.
[Ref. 57] This principle reveals operational or naval characteristics only as it is
calculated for operational formations and naval equipment.
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B. SOVIET THEORY OF NAVAL OPERATIONAL ART
A picture of the Soviet theory of naval operational art is constructed in
much the same way as a jigsaw puzzle. Citations from the SME and MED
combine with Soviet books and naval articles to develop a images of Soviet
military, operational and naval theory. The principles of Soviet military art
operate on the forces and means which combine to conduct military action.
Figure 4 attempts to show how these principles are focused in order to be
applied in the naval operational context. It is the resulting system of views
which then makes up the Soviet theory of naval operational art.




Principles of Naval Operational Art
Figure 4. Hierarchy of Soviet Naval Principles
A primary theoretical undercurrent runs through the Soviet theory of naval
operational art. Successful naval action is statistically dependent upon naval
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forces exhibiting characteristics as defined by the principles of military art.
These principles, in order to be effective, must reflect the unchanging laws of
armed conflict. The key to understanding the Soviet theory of naval
operational art is to study how the general principles of military art are
projected into the naval combat environment.
The principles of initiative, combat activeness and moral-political
conditioning describe characteristics of combat personnel. These principles,
therefore, possess no special operational or naval characteristics. The principle
of combat effectiveness refers to the weaponry of the opposing forces and is
uniquely naval only in that naval equipment varies from the weaponry of other
Soviet services.
The principles of combat readiness and capability, troop control, surprise,
massing of forces and means, deep operations and maneuver apply to opposing
naval forces and means in specific combat situations. Operational principles are
used in the Soviet employment operational formations. Soviet naval principles
appear because specific features of the combat environment at sea are so
different from combat on land.
The specific features of the naval combat environment appear to reflect a
Soviet naval theory of sea denial. The fact that naval formations do not seize
territory implies that the Soviets do not consider control of oceanic zones as
vital to Soviet interests. The concentration of Soviet naval forces so as to
destroy heavily defended enemy targets suggests a counterforce view of naval
warfare. Perhaps the basis of this Soviet theory is that no features of naval
terrain exist which make one zone of the ocean easier to defend or another
better for attack. If no advantageous terrain exists, then all terrain is equally
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good. The primary exception to this would be the naval strait. The fact that
enemy naval forces are geographically constrained while transiting straits
makes them more vulnerable to attack.
Admiral Chernavin lists what he feels to be "the most essential features,
connections, and relationships" of naval art in an article called, "Selected
Categories of the Naval Art." [Ref. 35:pp. 26-33] Chernavin chooses the
following as the most important categories of naval action
:
- Combat readiness;
- Surprise, with special emphasis on radioelectronic combat (electronic
warfare) and naval reconnaissance;
- Coordination;
- Maneuver;
- The increasing importance of accomplishing missions within a specific time
segment
;
- Decisive naval action or battle; and
- Strike, particularly important in naval operations because of the range and
power of modern cruise missiles.
In creating this list, Chernavin refers not just to operational art, but to the
entire scope of naval action. Combat readiness, surprise, coordination and
maneuver are principles of military art. Time is a characteristic reflected in the
strategic missions received by Soviet naval fleets as well in operational and
tactical missions constructed for fleet forces. Battle and strike are forms of
combat action. These are the characteristics which Chernavin is telling the
Soviet Navy to concentrate on in the preparation and execution of naval action.
The Soviet theory of naval operational art cannot be divorced from the
Soviet theory of military art. The specific naval characteristics of these
principles dominate the content of operations conducted independently by the
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Soviet Navy. In combined operations, the naval features of these principles
only apply to the portions of the operation which require the conduct of naval
action. The conduct of combined operations will depend much more heavily on
the theory of operational art of the dominant service. (In many cases the Soviet
Army.)
It is not enough to know Soviet theory to understand the conduct of Soviet
naval operations. One must study how these principles are applied. As
mentioned before, the Soviet concept of troop control governs the activities of
preparing and executing operations. Chapter III discusses how these principles
are shaped into a Soviet naval operation.
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III. THE PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS
How does a Soviet operational commander accomplish his assigned
strategic mission? In independent naval operations, the Soviet fleet
commander is responsible for the plan since he is the senior operational
naval commander. The same process of planning, though, can be used by a
flotilla or squadron commander. In combined operations, there are two
possibilities. If the Soviet Navy is responsible for the plan, then the naval
commander prepares and executes the plan. The supporting service only
contributes to planning pertinent sections of the operation. When the navy
is playing a secondary role in a combined operation, the other service
dominates the planning. The navy assists in planning only the naval sections
of the operation.
A. METHODOLOGY
Descriptions of how the Soviet ground forces prepare for operations
have greatly aided in this research. Recent reports [Refs. 58 & 59] reveal
how operational planning for Soviet combined-arms front operations were
taught at the Voroshilov Staff Academy in the mid-1970's. The Soviet book,
Fundamentals of Tactical Command and Control [Ref. 60] also describes the
Soviet process of planning, albeit primarily at the tactical level. In order to
discover if Soviet naval planning imitates Soviet ground planning, articles
from MorskoySbornik have been consulted.
Soviet naval articles describe a planning process nearly identical to that
of Soviet ground forces. Soviet Admirals Babiy [Ref. 61] and Smirnov [Ref.
62] both describe the basic sequences of planning outlined in this chapter.
The role of the operational commander, the sequence of activities
performed by the staff, parallel and sequential planning are all similarly
described by Soviet naval and ground military literature. Unfortunately,
Morskoy Sbornik articles do not describe the planning process in as great a
detail as the ground sources available to the author. This research,
therefore combines the two sources in order to develop a more complete
illustration of the naval planning process.
Two observations serve to support this approach. First, the Soviet
process of naval planning is based upon the theory of naval troop control.
As described in the preceding chapter, naval troop control is merely the
application of the general theory of troop control to the naval environment.
Since both the ground and naval planning processes evolve from the same
theoretical base, it is logical that there would be many similarities. Second,
the unified Soviet military structure must be able to conduct military
planning in three general operational scenarios. The Soviet Navy, Long
Range Aviation and Air Defense Forces plan independent operations; any
two Soviet services may coordinate in planning combined operations; or a
group of Soviet services may be coordinated by the Army to plan combined-
arms operations. The Soviet armed services are better able to cooperate in
such a potentially complex planning environment if they all employ a
common planning process.
B. PREPARATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL OPERATIONS
The Soviet fleet commander begins preparations for a specific
operation upon receipt of a strategic mission from the Soviet General Staff.
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This directive specifies the objective(s) of the mission, the time of
commencement and the time by which the objective(s) must be achieved.
[Ref. 58:pp. 12-13] The fleet commander immediately begins to "clarify the
mission." Clarification occurs as the fleet commander begins to understand
how the operation of his fleet will fit into the overall strategic operation of
the General Staff. [Ref. 58:p. 18] The fleet commander must understand
the goal of the operation. The success of the operation will be judged by
the fleet commander's ability to achieve that goal. [Ref. 63:p. 23] Figure 5
illustrates this transition of strategic goal into naval operation.
Strategic Goal: Prevent the enemy from striking the Soviet homeland
with nuclear weapons.
Strategic Mission: The Soviet Northern Fleet is ordered to destroy
enemy aircraft carriers capable of launching nuclear attacks before
they reach their potential launch points in the Arctic TSMA beginning
on ...
Independent Naval Operation : Coordination of submarines, naval
aviation, and surface combatants to destroy enemy carriers before
they reach their launch points. Deployment will begin on ...
Figure 5. Example of Transition from Goal to Operation
The mission received by the Soviet fleet commander establishes
geographical boundaries forthe conduct of the operation. An independent
naval operation is conducted in an oceanic TSMA within a "zone of
operations." [Ref. 64] This zone is a purely naval Soviet term. The location
and size of the zone is determined by the various military and political
factors which are analyzed by the Soviet High Command in the development
of strategic missions.
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The fleet commander's mission also assigns temporal boundaries. Based
upon the time limits defined by the General Staff's orders, the fleet
commander's chief of staff prepares a timetable establishing when each
phase of the operation plan is due. [Ref. 65] The timetable is used to
scientifically organize the staff's work for maximum efficiency. Norms are
established which define how long each step of the planning process should
take. If no norms have been established, the chief of staff may calculate the
expected time required by combining his staff experience with the use of
probability theory [Ref. 60:pp. 139-40].
(3Tm j n + 2Tm ax) 2
Texp = ; O = 0.04(Tmax -Tmin)2
5
Tmin - minimum expected time
Tmax
- maximum expected time
Texp - expected duration
O -standard deviation
Norms are determined and calculations are performed in advance of actual
operational planning. The Soviet chief of staff need only review a standard
timetable and adapt it to the current situation. When the chief of staff is
done, the commander approves the timetable and preparations for the
operation begin in earnest. A sample timetable is shown in Figure 6.
If the operation will be commencing shortly, then the fleet commander
may choose to transmit a warning order to his subordinate forces so that
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Figure 6. Timetable for Preparation of the Operation
[Adapted from Ref. 60:pp. 128-129]
subordinate forces would be ordered to cancel all leaves and recall all
personnel. Each unit would be ordered to maximize its combat readiness
paying particular attention to ammunition levels, combat stores, fuel and
other supplies. [Ref. 58:p. 21]
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With the mission received and the forces alerted, the fleet commander
and his staff now split the process of preparation into two phases, each
containing several steps. In the first phase, the fleet commander makes his
decision on how the operation shall proceed. In the second phase, the staff
performs the detailed planning necessary to implement the commander's
decision. When these two phases are complete, the operation plan is
established and the fleet staff's duty becomes ensuring that the
commander's plan is executed properly.
The staff's first task is to present the fleet commander with an estimate
of the situation. This operational situation report describes the naval
combat environment developing within the assigned zone of operations
over a specified period of time. [Ref. 66] The chief of reconnaissance begins
the briefing by presenting an estimate of the enemy [Ref. 58:pp. 22-26].
This estimate describes the location, strength, state and combat capabilities
of known enemy units [Ref. 67]. The chief of reconnaissance classifies the
quality of his information as either reliable, probable, doubtful and spurious
[Ref. 68].
Following the briefing on the enemy, the chief of operations presents
an estimate of friendly forces. The fleet commander is reminded of the
location, strength and combat capability of the naval forces under his
command [Ref. 67]. Included in this presentation are calculations on how
long it will take to bring the subordinate forces to a required level of
combat readiness. This combat readiness is partially determined by
multiplying the total number of pieces of fleet military equipment by a
readiness coefficient [Ref. 69]. These readiness coefficients quantify the
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reliability of various types of materiel. These measures of reliability are
largely determined by the amount of operating time on the equipment [Ref
.
70].
The final briefing presents the meteorological and geographical
conditions within the zone of operations. The information in these
briefings is presented on charts in significant detail. For example, an ice
chart depicting the ice situation within a zone of operations would indicate
the boundaries of floe and pack ice, ice types and forms, ice density, age,
thickness, degree of hummocking and disintegration, dimensions and
locations of polynyas, leads and current holes, and direction of the ice field
drift [Ref. 71]. Charts depicting the navigational, hydrographic,
hydrometeorological, hydrologic, geographical, ice and mine environment
are all periodically updated and maintained at the disposal of the fleet
commander [Ref. 67]. To interpret this information, the fleet staff begins
calculations on the correlation of forces and means [Ref. 58:p. 27].
The naval correlation of forces and means is constructed with the goal
and the mission of the operation in mind. In other words, the correlation is
more than just a raw comparison of numbers. The Soviet's construct the
correlation in order to measure their ability to achieve combat superiority
overthe enemy in a given situation [Ref. 72]. Sometimes the correlation will
be direct. For example, in analyzing submarines attacking submarines, the
ratio of friendly to enemy submarines in a given area would be measured to
determine the likelihood of success. When the opposing forces are not
identical, then the correlation must take this into account. The effectiveness
of an cruise missile attack on enemy carriers would be measured against the
enemy air defense strength.
The correlation of forces and means also attempts to take into account
qualitative differences between friendly and enemy forces. [Ref. 72] These
quantitative and qualitative variables are then simplified into usable
mathematical expressions. For instance, the correlation between two
weapons systems might be modeled as: [Ref. 73]
Correlation of Forces = — II _L_L 1
N2 V l P2 n 2 J
N - Number of weapons platforms
P - Probability of single shot kill
n - Maximum rate of fire
1 - Friendly forces
2 - Enemy forces
The Voroshilov material demonstrates that the quality of equipment,
the level of training, the amount of supplies can mostly be reduced to a
single numeric factor [Ref. 59:pp. 1-2]. A U.S. cruiser may be given a quality
factor of .8 or 1.2 depending on the Soviet's estimation of the cruiser's
combat capability relative to a Soviet cruiser. These quality factors are used
to adjust the numerical correlation.
Nuclear and conventional weapons are treated differently by the
Soviets in the correlation of forces and means. The use of traditional
conventional weapons in armed conflict slowly shifts the overall correlation.
During conventional conflict, the operational commander is able to
continually monitor and react to changes in the correlation. Nuclear
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weapons, however, are capable of causing rapid shifts in the correlation of
forces and means. With nuclear weapons, the operational commander
cannot effectively monitor the shift as it occurs but instead must compare
the post-nuclear exchange correlation to the pre-nuclear situation. [Ref : 74]
The presence of enemy nuclear weapons affects the conduct of Soviet
operations whether or not nuclear weapons are being used. In both cases,
Soviet combat efforts concentrate on destroying enemy nuclear means. This
is necessary in order to influence the post-nuclear exchange correlation of
forces in case the enemy decides to escalate. [Ref. 74]
The Soviet's naval correlation differs from the ground correlation in
that the naval does not measure the capture of enemy territory. Soviet
ground correlations measure the density of enemy forces over a given width
and depth of the battlefield [Ref. 58:pp. 22-24]. The naval correlation
measures the strength of opposing military forces within an operational
zone [Ref. 72].
The fleet commander analyzes the correlation of forces in order to
determine how to organize his formations. The Soviets believe that a
certain ratio of superiority will create the necessary conditions for successful
attack. For example, Soviet front commanders attempt to achieve a
superiority of 3:1 over defending enemy units. [Ref. 59:p. 1] Similar norms
are likely created within the Soviet Navy. If the Soviet commander cannot
achieve the required ratio of superiority over the enemy forces in their
entirety, then the fleet commander must consider how to attack the enemy
forces a portion at a time. The fleet commander's conclusions regarding
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the conduct of forthcoming operations are called the concept of the
operation. [Ref. 61 :p. 28] This broad term encompasses: [Ref. 75]
- The direction or main axis of attack and other thrusts;
- The sequence and methods of combat action;
- The procedures for the delivery of conventional and/or nuclear strikes;
- The required force groupings and their tactical order of battle.
The fleet commander's concept is used to develop several alternatives.
Analyzing these alternatives or "substantiating" the commander's decision
is the second step in this first phase of Soviet planning. [Ref. 61 :p. 28] In this
phase, the fleet staff employs mathematical analysis to examine the various
alternatives in terms of combat effectiveness. Criteria are established by
which to measure the desirability of the options under consideration such
as: [Ref. 76]
- probability of destroying the desired target;
- maximum (minimum) expected damage with specified probability;
- time required to accomplish mission.
Several analytical techniques are deemed useful by the Soviets in examining
these criteria.
Probability theory is used to forecast the effectiveness of various search
techniques. Captain-Engineer Alekseyev describes the development of
tables which capture the statistical relationships of search and detection for
staff use. Alekseyev's procedures measure the probability of successful
search by comparing the area to be searched with the searching forces.
These calculations can be used to determine the number of search forces
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required to achieve a desired probability of detection or the process can be
reversed producing an expected probability of detection. [Ref . 77]
Queuing theory is employed to model the effectiveness of various air
defense and ASW missions [Ref. 78]. Queuing theory studies the process of
servicing arriving units with a specified number of servers. Two critical
variables from the standpoint of ASW and air defense are the number of
servers (ASW/air defense teams) and service time (time required to destroy
the enemy unit). Logically, the total service given (total number of enemy
units destroyed) increases as the number of servers increase and the service
time decreases. Depending upon how the Soviets model the ASW or air
defense process, queuing theory equations provide predictions of
engagement rate and the probability that enemy forces will penetrate the
defense.
Game theory decision matrices also aid the Soviet commander in
evaluating the combined effects of enemy and friendly alternatives. A 1979
Morskoy Sbornik article uses game theory to "substantiate" alternatives in
planning an air strike to destroy an enemy aircraft carrier. [Ref. 79] In the
article, the staff presents the commanding officer of a fleet naval air group
with a decision matrix to aid in determining the best alternative for the air
strike. Figure 7 illustrates the scenario used by this article.
The final step in the decision-making phase begins as the staff presents
their analyses to the fleet commander. The commander bears the ultimate
responsibility for the success of the operation. He recognizes that scientific
aids do not address all of the qualitative aspects of warfare. The



















Ai Skirt enemy CAP without
refueling
A2 Skirt enemy CAP with
refueling
A3 Penetrate enemy CAP
SideB:
B1 Launch light attack aircraft
at maximum range
B2 Launch all aircraft at maximum
range for heavy bombers
B3 Launch all aircraft at light bomber
range and refuel at friendly airfield
MISSION : Destroy enemy A/C carrier
[Effectiveness measured by % of
damage avoided by ground
targets]
GAME THEORY MATRIX
B1 B 2 B3
A1 0.85 0.30 0.05
A 2 0.70 0.60 0.20
A3 0.50 0.40 0.30
Figure 7. Game Theory in Support of the Commander's Decision
[Adapted from Ref. 79]
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of alternatives analyzed. This selection represents the commander's
judgment, combining both experience and analysis, on the basic
requirement necessary for fulfilling the fleet's assigned mission. [Ref. 79:p.
21] The fleet commander's decision assigns missions to the forces and gives
instructions for their preparation. The staff then begins the second phase of
the preparation process, the detailed planning necessary to implement the
commander's decision. This second phase is called planning the operation.
[Ref. 62:p. 20]
The detailed planning of a Soviet naval operation consists of preparing
several important planning documents. First, the staff plots the
commander's decision on a chart. This becomes the chief regulating
document for guiding the subsequent development of the operation. [Ref.
62:p. 20] This chart or map is updated as the detailed planning proceeds
and is the single document which most reflects the content of the entire
operation.
A second set of documents is the coordination plan. These documents
specify how individual forces are supposed to coordinate in order to
complete their assigned missions. The coordination plan specifies the
principal missions, the sequence of their execution, the missions of each
subordinate force in place and time. Attached to the coordination plan are
several documents which specify the communications requirements,
procedures for mutual identification and recognition, target designation
and special control signals. [Ref. 80]
The third set of documents are the plans for operational combat






















































PVO - Air Defense Forces
Figure 8. Sample Coordination Plan
[Adapted from Ref. 64]
combat or combat service support for the operation. For each type of
support, a chart is drawn up identifying each support mission, the assigned
forces and the method of conducting the planned support action. These
charts or maps are all based on the commander's operation plan. [Ref. 81]
Two such documents are prepared for the organization of deception
and the movement and delivery of combat supplies. Deception
(maskirovka) is a category of operational (combat) support. Depending
upon the commander's decision, the deception plan coordinates the
accomplishment of diversionary actions, the simulation of force
concentrations and the dissemination of false information to the enemy
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regarding the combat readiness of Soviet forces and the likely character of
forthcoming combat actions [Ref. 82]. The logistic plan establishes
procedures for the delivery of operational supplies to fleet units. The
delivery of these supplies is prioritized to ensure that the main force
grouping is well prepared for combat [Ref. 83]. These operational supplies
are maintained at bases and depots by the Soviet Rear Services and are
constantly at the disposal of the fleet commander. Day to day operations do
not consume these operational supplies, instead use a second set of supplies
called expendable supplies. [Ref. 84]
When the detailed planning is completed and approved by the chief of
staff and fleet commander, an operation order is fashioned which contains:
[Ref. 85]
- Estimates of the enemy;
- Missions of the fleet;
- General plan of operations;
- Missions and sequence of weapons employment by senior command
echelons in the zone of operations;
- Missions of adjacent units and established boundaries;
- Missions of subordinate force groups;
- Composition of supporting forces;
- Composition of reserve forces;
- Time schedule for the operation; and
- Location and time of control facility deployment.
This entire plan is then submitted to the next senior echelon in the chain
of command for approval. In the case of the fleet commander, this would
be the General Staff's fleet representative or the continental TSMA
commander. Upon receiving approval from his superiors, the fleet
commander then transmits his orders to his subordinate fleet forces. [Ref.
62:p. 19] This process of preparation is summarized in Figure 9.
Receipt of Mission
l
Concept of the Operation
i




- Preparation of Coordination Plan
- Preparation of Operational Support Plans
- Preparation of the Operation Plan
I
Senior Echelon Approval
Figure 9. Preparation of Soviet Operations
The Soviets believe that the planning of operations must be completed
quickly and efficiently in order to maximize the time left for subordinate
forces to prepare. Traditionally, the fleet commander waited for his
superior's final approval before transmitting orders to his fleet. This is
called the successive method of planning. In order to save time, the Soviets
have developed a parallel method of planning. In parallel planning the
subordinate forces conduct their tactical planning based upon the
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operational concept of the fleet commander. Figure 10 compares these two
planning methods. When the fleet commander's plan is approved, then
they can complete their plans and submit them for approval to the fleet
commander. [Ref. 62:pp. 19-20]
SEQUENTIAL PLANNING PARALLEL PLANNING
Operational Formation Operational Formation
Tactical Formation
(~nnrf»pt nf <~>pprAtinn<L ron(-e pt of operations
" Concept of Operations
Commander's Decision Commander's Decision
* t
Planning the Operation Tactical Formation Planning the Operation ^
+ 4
Senior Approval ^ Concept of Operations Senior Approval > Commander's Decision
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Figure 10. Sequential vs. Parallel Planning
C. PREPARATION OF COMBINED OPERATIONS WITH NAVAL
PARTICIPATION
As stated earlier, the planning of a combined operation is dominated by
one of the two services involved. This stems from an important principle of
Soviet troop control which requires that a single commander exercise
centralized control over an operational plan. [Ref. 60:pp. 122-123] That
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single commander must make timely decisions and take full responsibility
for the conduct of the operation. This centralization of control is balanced
with the need for initiative (decentralization) in a quickly changing naval
combat environment. Therefore the degree of centralization must be
determined on a case by case basis.
The Voroshilov Academy material describes how a naval fleet
commander would support the operational commander of another service
in executing a combined operation. A naval assault operation (amphibious
landing) is generally organized under the operational command of an Army
front. A naval task force is placed under the command of the Army front
with the naval commander acting as assistant front commander for naval
affairs. [Ref. 86:p. 10] The naval commander's role is to assist in the
preparations of the portions of the front commander's plan which are
purely naval.
When the combined operation is under the command of a naval
commander, the positions are reversed. The commander of the supporting
service aids the naval operational commander in reaching his decision. Once
the naval commander's decision is made, the supporting service commander
assists in the detailed planning.
In either case, the activities of planning are carried out as described in
the previous section on independent planning. The Soviet process of
planning appears to be identical regardless of service. When it is modified,
it is to fit the situation not the service.
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D. CONTROLLING THE EXECUTION OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Soviet troop control agencies govern not only the preparation, but also
the execution of Soviet operations:
It is important in this case that the subordinate commanders know and
constantly feel that they are not alone in combat. Placing his confidence
in them, the senior commander constantly follows the progress of the
battle and can at any time render them assistance with all the resources
available to him. However, this assistance is possible only when the senior
commander knows the progress and results of his subordinates'
performance of their tactical mission. Hence, the unquestionable
requirement: "Delegate and follow up." Still, this following up is not an
extraordinary measure calculated to "catch" or "expose" someone. His
primary and " more complex task is to check the correctness of the work ...
check the system of organization of operations, to ensure the greatest
productivity in the operation..." [Ref. 60:p. 297]
This quotation comes from the Soviet book on tactical troop control.
Substitute the words "operation" for "battle" and "operational" for
"tactical" and it could well apply to Soviet operations. The Soviet
operational commander monitors the progress of the operation by
measuring the success achieved by his subordinates in completing assigned
operational missions.
The fleet commander controls the execution from his fleet command
post. This command post is a specially equipped and protected structure
from which the fleet staff can exercise control of subordinate forces [Ref.
87]. An alternate command post is established and remains in constant
communication with both the fleet command post and subordinate fleet
forces [Ref. 88]. Both of these command posts are usually located at the
main fleet base [Ref. 89].
The fleet commander uses an operational situation map and the
correlation of forces and means to monitor the progress of the operation.
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This situation map use symbols to display the most recently received combat
information for the fleet commander. [Ref . 90]
The commander and his staff continually interpret this information with
the correlation of forces and means. The Voroshilov Academy material
explains how this correlation is used
:
At the operational level the staff is continually updating the projected
correlation of forces expected to occur at the various phase lines such as
that for the various expected lines for enemy counterattack. If they
foresee something turning out unfavorably they will immediately take
steps to alter the correlation by changing the plan in the least disruptive
way. They will give the new predictions to the commander. According to
most norms the plan will try to establish a three to one ratio in forces at
the critical phase lines. If the expected ratio is down to two to one during
part of the battle and on part of the field that may be acceptable, but
below two to one will trigger some sort of revision. [Ref. 59:p. 3]
As described earlier, the conventional and nuclear correlation of forces
and means are quite different. Yet, the Soviets believe that the operational
plan must prepare for both nuclear and conventional warfare [Ref. 91] For
the Soviets, it cannot be predicted with certainty when the enemy may
chose to introduce nuclear weapons. The Soviet fleet commander's use of
the nuclear correlation is not described in Soviet naval articles; but, the fleet
commander's concern for the effects of nuclear escalation can only be
satisfied by constantly monitoring a post-nuclear exchange correlation of
forces. In this way the fleet commander is able to continuously monitor the
effects of a possible nuclear escalation during the conduct of conventional
operations.
Implicit in any Soviet post-nuclear correlation would be the mission
assignment of enemy targets to Soviet nuclear capable units. Without using
nuclear targeting information, the nuclear correlation could not accurately
evaluate the destruction of friendly and enemy units, disruption of
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communications and movement of combat units. These changing
characteristics in the combat situation must be constantly incorporated into
the nuclear correlation for it to have any immediate value to the fleet
commander. In this sense, the nuclear correlation becomes in effect a
nuclear exchange simulation which is continually updated with combat
information. This postulated use of the post-nuclear exchange correlation
of forces,though, is useful in explaining two characteristics of Soviet
operations.
The Soviet fleet commander is inordinately concerned with the
destruction of enemy aircraft carriers before they reach their potential
launch points. Even in the context of conventional conflict, Soviet
operational commanders make this a requirement. If the Soviet commander
is monitoring a post-nuclear exchange correlation of forces, then as enemy
aircraft carriers capable of launching nuclear strikes close within range of
Soviet targets the nuclear correlation shifts in favor of the enemy. The
Soviet commander, therefore, is acting so as to maximize both the
conventional and nuclear correlations by requiring the destruction of enemy
carriers before they reach their launch points.
The Voroshilov Academy material provides a second justification for this
use of the post-nuclear exchange correlation. The Soviets always prepare
nuclear strike plan regardless of whether the operation is to be
conventional or nuclear. This strike plan assigns nuclear missions to Soviet
nuclear capable units. [Ref. 86:p. 13] The Soviet fleet commander needs
some way to monitor the effects of conventional battle on the nuclear strike
6
plan. The postulated post-nuclear exchange correlation would fulfill just
such a role.
E. SUMMARY
The Soviet theory of naval operational art produces principles which the
Soviet fleet commander believes must be used to achieve success in naval
operations. Soviet troop control takes these theoretical principles and
develops practical applications which bring the operation into existence.
The theoretical elements of this plan are combined with up to date
information on the combat situation. The fleet commander's sole purpose
in preparing the naval operation is to create the conditions for success when
Soviet naval forces engage in combat.
The activities of Soviet naval operational planning are designed to help
the fleet commander fabricate the operational plan. The naval correlation
of forces and means measures to what extent the massing of Soviet forces
can achieve superiority over the enemy. The coordination plan breaks the
operation down into its component tactical segments and assigns specific
missions which coordinate the actions of Soviet forces. The plans for
deception, reconnaissance, antimine, air defense and logistics ensure that
Soviet forces entering combat have received the benefit of well organized
combat support.
The Soviet desire for combat readiness affects the Soviet fleet
commander in several ways. First, the entire process of planning naval
operations must be completed as rapidly as possible in order to maximize
the time available for preparing naval forces for battle. Second, because of
the use of readiness coefficients which measure the readiness of naval
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equipment, the fleet commander will tend to minimize the operating time
of his forces when operations are not being conducted.
The Soviet fleet commander also optimizes his combat readiness by
keeping his naval forces in close proximity to the theater naval basing
system and the zones of anticipated operation. If the fleet commander
envisions his probable zones of operation as contained within the seas
contiguous to the Soviet Union, then he will develop his naval logistic
elements throughout these seas and keep out-of-area naval deployments to
a minimum. On the other hand, if the Soviet fleet commander expects to
operate in some forward zone of operation, then he must create a logistic
structure for that zone and deploy the necessary naval forces in order to
achieve some level of combat readiness.
A reading of the Voroshilov Academy material suggests that the Soviet
military commander does not divide the spectrum of combat into nuclear
and conventional combat. For the Soviets, nuclear weapons have
irrevocably altered the nature of all combat. The Soviet operational
commander views combat action as being conducted either with nuclear
weapons or without.
At the tactical level of naval combat, the difference between nuclear
and non-nuclear attack is only a difference of degree as measured by the
Soviet correlation of forces. Both conventional and nuclear armed missiles
are capable of rapidly shifting the tactical correlation in favor of one side or
the other. Admiral Chernavin discusses this situation in his article, "Teach
What Will Be Necessary in War"
:
Never forget that the greater range and accuracy of weapons places a
two-fold taslc before tactical commanders.
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On one hand, they have to preempt the opponent in firing, to do which
they must master the art of hitting him with the first salvo at optimum
range. Otherwise he can succeed in employing his weapons and placing
our forces at a disadvantage....
On the other hand, navymen must be perpetually at a high state of
readiness to repel unexpected mass enemy attacks with all types of
weapons and to maintain the ships' battleworthiness after suffering
damage. [Ref. 92:pp. 5-6]
At the operational level, a difference still exists between nuclear and
non-nuclear attack. In non-nuclear operations, Soviet naval forces strive to
create superiority over the enemy. There is an assumed exchange of
weapons and attrition of forces on both sides. In nuclear operations, Soviet
forces focus not on superiority but on preemption. Only through first strike
can Soviet naval forces win a nuclear war.
Preparations for Soviet nuclear and non-nuclear operations must be
combined into a single operational plan. The Soviet fleet commander is
tasked with completing a strategic mission. He must be ready to conduct
the operation without knowing beforehand if the conflict will escalate to
the use of nuclear weapons. The fleet commander must prepare for the
eventuality of nuclear escalation be creating a nuclear fire plan and
designating actions to be carried out in the event of nuclear escalation. As
he monitors the conduct of the operation, the fleet commander observes
shifts in both the nuclear and non-nuclear correlation of forces.
One further characteristic of Soviet operational planning is the Soviet
desire to finalize the operational plan immediately prior to the conduct of
combat action. Contingency plans can be created ahead of time, but they
are not sufficient for the conduct of actual operations. The fleet
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commander and his staff must review preplanned actions before the
operation in order to ensure that the plan conforms to the actual situation.
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IV. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS
Just as Soviet operational art cannot be isolated from Soviet strategy
and tactics, so too Soviet naval action cannot be fully examined without
considering the conduct of Soviet operations on land. How does the military
leadership of the Soviet Union view the naval operation?
In an attempt to look beyond what the Soviets say to see what they do,
two naval operations from World War II have been selected from Soviet
literature. The first is a 1942 anti-SLOC operation conducted by the Soviet
Baltic Fleet. The second is a riverine operation conducted by the Soviet 1 5th
Army and the Amur Flotilla in the 1945. Manchurian campaign. In each of
these situations, the Soviet Supreme High Command elected to employ
naval forces in combat. What role did they play in the Soviet conduct of
war?
A. 1942 SOVIET SUBMARINE OPERATION AGAINST BALTIC SLOCS
1. Background
After the German surprise attack in June 1941, the Soviet Baltic
Fleet was moved from its main base in Tallinn to the ports of Khronshtadt
and Leningrad. Khronshtadt was made the fleet's new main naval base. As
the siege of Leningrad began in October 1941, the majority of the Baltic
Fleet's warships were assigned for the internal defense of Leningrad. [Ref.
93:p.288]
As the Soviet military struggled through the first months of the
war, several organizational changes occurred which affected the Baltic
65
Fleet's chain of command. Joseph Stalin, through the State Defense
Committee, became both the People's Commissar for Defense and the
Supreme Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces. The General
Headquarters of the Supreme Command operated under Stalin's control.
The main working organ of the General Headquarters was the General
Staff. [Ref. 93: pp. 274-6]
Three strategic sectors were identified after the initial German
attack. In each of these three sectors, the State Defense Committee created
a High Command for Strategic Sectors. The Baltic Fleet, the Northern Fleet,
the Northern and Northwestern Fronts comprised the High Command for
the Northwest Sector under the command of Marshal K. Voroshilov. [Ref.
93:pp. 274-6]
At the beginning of 1942, Leningrad was wedged between the
German Army Group North to the south and Finnish troops to the north.
Leningrad's only link with the rest of the Soviet Union was a road across the
ice of Lake Ladoga. Between January and March, Soviet forces south of
Leningrad engaged German troops in fierce fighting in the first Soviet
winter offensive. [Ref. 94:pp. 242-8] Figure 11 shows the isolation of
Leningrad at the end of 1941.
On February 21, in the midst of these Soviet Army operations, the
General Headquarters of the High Command formed a special air group
consisting of 5 bomber and mine-torpedo regiments and 5 fighter
regiments. Their mission was to cooperate with Baltic Fleet aviation to
destroy targets along Baltic sea lanes and shoreline. [Ref. 95:pp. 35-36] At







Figure 11. The Baltic Offensive in December 1941
[Ref.94:p. 100]
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issued a directive to the Soviet fleet's which "emphasized the significance of
attacking enemy sea lanes." [Ref. 6:p. 228] This directive was supposedly
based upon the general strategic tasks which confronted the Soviet Navy in
1942. As a result of this directive, the Military Council of the Soviet Baltic
Fleet issued orders to begin a submarine anti-SLOC operation.
It appears that in February 1942, the High Command designed a
strategic operation to disrupt Baltic SLOCs. This is not discussed by Soviet
authors, but is instead suggested by the timing of the creation of the special
air group and the Baltic Fleet's orders to begin an anti-SLOC operation. It
was up to the Baltic Fleet commander to design the submarine operation
which would implement this strategic plan.
2. The Operation
As Vice Admiral V. F. Tributs, Baltic Fleet Commander, considered
operating against German Baltic SLOCs, several details must have been
presented in his staff's estimate of the situation. In the fall of 1941, German
aircraft had dropped mines to disrupt seaborne transits between
Khronshtadt and Leningrad. Throughout the winter, German forces seized
most of the islands in the Gulf of Finland. Several German acoustic-radio
detection stations had been established and over 10,000 German mines
were deployed. In addition to these fixed defenses, a contingent of German
naval forces comprised of small boats and minesweepers were stationed in
Finland. [Ref. 95:p. 34] Figure 12 shows the Baltic situation.
On March 14, the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet issued the
following operational missions to the Balticsubmarine brigade:








- lay mines on enemy sealanes; and
- determine the sealanes of enemy warships, channels and the character
of the enemy ASW system in the Gulf of Finland.
On March 27, the Military Council amended this order adding that enemy
warships must be kept out of the Eastern Gulf of Finland. [Ref. 95:p. 35]
Admiral Tributs' decision determined that Soviet submarines would
exit the Gulf in three echelons. The first echelon would operate in the Baltic
from June to July with two submarines designated to operate solely in the
Gulf of Finland. The second echelon was to exit the Gulf upon the return of
the first, and operate against German SLOCs from July to August. The third
would then exit in mid-September and operate until winter ice precluded
further actions. The intent of the operation was to continuously engage
German Baltic SLOCs over a period of six months. [Ref. 95:p. 35]
The deploying submarines were to receive escort as far as Hogland
island, but then were to transit independently through German ASW
positions. The Soviets calculated that the probability of a submarine
encountering a mine was between 0.25 and 0.35 [Ref. 6:p. 227]. Upon
reaching the Baltic, Soviet submarines would occupy predesignated
positions along German SLOCs in order to carry out their attacks. The Soviet
call this method of submarine attack the "positional method." [Ref. 95:p.
35]
Throughout April, the Baltic submarine brigade headquarters
worked with the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet in order to complete the
detailed planning necessary to implement Admiral Tributs' decision. By
April 20, several measures of operational support and coordination had
been worked out. Baltic Fleet aircraft were to conduct reconnaissance of
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the Baltic coastline including the Gulf of Riga and Gulf of Bothnia.
Immediately prior to the exit of a submarine echelon, Baltic Fleet aircraft
would conduct strikes on enemy patrols and ASW positions in the vicinity of
Hogland Island. Available Soviet surface forces were to escort the deploying
submarines as far as Hogland Island. Beyond Hogland, the submarines were
to transit independently. [Ref. 6:p. 229]
Preparations were also made for Baltic Fleet aircraft to provide
targeting information to deployed submarines; however, practical
difficulties interfered. The submarine commander had to be surfaced in
order to communicate with aircraft. These same submariners were told to
operate on the surface only in periods of low visibility. As a result, Baltic
Fleet aircraft could only provide targeting data under the worst of weather
conditions. [Ref. 6:p. 229]
In addition to preparing these measures of coordination, logistical
support was augmented by the formation of special brigades of skilled labor
composed of submarine personnel and workers from Leningrad. These
brigades were tasked with completing all required repair work before the
commencement of the operation in June. [Ref. 95:p. 35]
This Soviet operation did not start smoothly. Throughout May and
June, German air forces laid several hundred influence mines near
Khronshtadt. In June 1942, the Supreme High Command took direct control
of the operations of fronts and fleets [Ref. 93:p. 276]. The special air group
was reassigned to support combat to the north. Only Baltic Fleet aviation
remained to support the submarine operation, and it was simultaneously
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responsible for supporting Soviet ground troops near Leningrad. [Ref.
95:pp. 34-35]
With these problems, the 1st submarine echelon's deployment was
delayed until mid-June. Nine submarines in all departed singly or in small
groups from mid-June to early July. The Soviets report that this first echelon
achieved success by sinking 15 enemy transports. In addition, 1st echelon
submarines clarified the Baltic Fleet's estimate of the situation with
information on enemy shipping routes and ASW positions. Three
submarines did not return. Throughout the operation, coordination
between submarines and aircraft was never to be realized. [Ref. 95:pp. 35-
36]
Because of its late departure, the first echelon was also late in
returning. The Baltic Fleet Military Council determined that the 2nd
echelon should not leave until after the return of the first. The Soviets cite
several reasons for this decision. First, Soviet surface forces could not
accommodate escorting the simultaneous deployment and return of Baltic
Fleet submarines. Second, no provisions had been made to prevent attacks
by Soviet submarines on each other while passing in the Gulf of Finland.
Third, a sudden large concentration of Soviet submarines in the Gulf would
increase the probability that German and Finnish ASW positions would
detect and attack transiting submarines. These practical reasons are
weighed against the theoretical requirement to maintain continuous action
against German SLOCs. [Ref. 6:p. 233]
In mid-August, a second echelon of 10 submarines deployed
through the Gulf. These submarines transited to Hogland submerged,
7
escorted by Soviet minesweepers and antisub launches. The second echelon
operated simultaneously in separate regions of the Baltic accumulating a
record of sinking 16 transports, two destroyers and one enemy submarine
according to Soviet sources. [Ref. 95:p. 35]
The People's Commissar of the Navy had been monitoring the
progress of the Baltic Fleet operation and ordered the Baltic Fleet to
intensify its efforts. Admiral Tributs increased the size of the 3rd echelon
from 10 to 15 submarines. In addition, the 3rd echelon put to sea on
December 15 without waiting for the complete return of the 2nd echelon.
By this time, German and Finnish forces had reinforced their ASW positions
by using anti- submarine nets. Soviet sources attribute the 3rd echelon with
more sinkings than either of the two earlier echelons. Ice soon forced 3rd
echelon submarines to return to port. [Ref. 95:pp. 35-36]
3. Soviet Critique
The Soviet Navy applauds several aspects of this operation. The
independent crossing of enemy ASW positions by Soviet submarines is
described as an impressively courageous feat. Soviet submarines are said to
have sunk 65 transports and warships. Perhaps of more importance, the
actions of Soviet Baltic submariners slowed the transport of strategic cargo
and the Germans were forced to shift from individual ship crossings to
convoys. [Ref. 95:pp. 34-37]
The Soviets also cite several factors which hindered the conduct of
this operation: [Ref. 6:pp. 224-241]
- Air support was sporatic. The special air group was reassigned and
Baltic Fleet aviation was substantially occupied with support of Soviet
ground operations.
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- Submarine transits of enemy ASW positions would have benefited from
more active support of Soviet aviation and surface forces.
- Using the positional method of attack limited the initiative of Soviet
submariners and enabled the Germans to identify some of the positions
used by Soviet submarines.
Overall, while the Soviet Navy considers this submarine operation a success,
Soviet history in general does not portray this operation as crucial to the
Soviet war effort. The book, Basic Stages of the Great Patriotic War , does
not even list the operation as one of the important operations of the war.
[Ref
. 96]
B. 1945 AMUR FLOTILLA SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET 1 5TH ARMY
In studying the combined operation completed by the Amur Flotilla and
the Soviet 15th Army in Manchuria, a unique opportunity presents itself.
The recently translated Soviet book, The Initial Period of War [Ref. 97],
discusses the strategic operation developed by the Soviet Supreme High
Command for the Soviet defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army . Recall
that a strategic operation is a plan developed by the General Staff which
assigns strategic missions to fronts and fleets in a given TSMA. The U.S.
Army's Combat Studies Institute has published a detailed study of this
strategic operation based upon Soviet sources [Refs. 98 & 99]. These works
combined with a Soviet naval article describing the actions of the Amur
Flotilla [Ref. 100] describe how a Soviet naval flotilla was employed in a
strategic operation in World War II.
1. Background
Three months after the defeat of Germany, the Soviet Union
declared war on Japan and rapidly opened a new strategic front in the Far
East. The initial strategic operation in this theater envisioned the conduct of
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three separate actions. The primary task was an invasion of Manchuria. The
Soviet South Sakhalin operation and Kurile assault operations were smaller
and coordinated with the conduct of the larger Manchurian operation. [Ref.
97:p.246]
The Soviet High Command developed the following strategic plan
for the destruction of the Kwantung Army as shown in Figure 13. The
overall concept of the plan called for two main attacks converging on the
center of Manchuria in order to divide the Japanese forces. Deep
enveloping maneuver was to be used by advancing Soviet forces to quickly
defeat the enemy in detail (unit by unit). The assaults on South Sakhalin and
the Kurile islands were to depend upon the success of the main operation.
[Ref.97:p.249]
The overall correlation of Soviet to Japanese forces was generally in
the Soviet's favor: [Ref. 97:p. 250]
Soviet Forces : Japanese Forces
Troops 1.2 : 1
Tanks/S. P. Guns 4.8 1
Artillery 4.8 1
Aviation 2.5 1
(S. P. Guns - Self Propelled Guns)
The Supreme High Command also calculated the correlation of forces along
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Figure 13. The Manchurian Invasion 1945 [Ref 98:p. 76]
76
Transbaykal Maritime Amur
Troops 1.7:1 1.5:1 1.4:1
Tanks/S.P. Guns 5:1 8:1 8:1
Guns 8.6:1 4:1 2:1
Mortars 18:1 overwhelming 8.2:1
The entire strategic operation would develop across a front of 500 km to a
depth of 600-800 km and was to take 20 to 24 days to complete. These
figures determined the rates of advance necessary along each of the
strategic axes.
The Supreme High Command then developed the strategic missions
for the Soviet Far Eastern Forces: [Ref. 97:p. 252]
- Transbaykal Front; split into two echelons and attack across the Greater
Khingan Range and disruptthe enemy rear area.
- First Far Eastern Front; breakthrough Japanese defenses, commit the
10th Mechanized Corps to a depth of 100-1 50 km.
- Second Far Eastern Front; cross the Amur and Ussuri rivers, develop
action to an operational depth.
- Pacific Fleet support actions of First and Second Fronts. Amur Flotilla
support crossings of Amur and Ussuri rivers.
- Soviet-Mongolian Forces; Cooperate to protect the flanks of First Tank
army in Transbaykal Front.
- Air Groups of the Fronts; Enhance surprise by not conducting
reconnaissance in advance of combat action. As the attack develops,
deliver massed strikes along strategic axes.
- Air Defense Forces; Protect the massing of Soviet troops and major
strategic targets in the Soviet tactical rear.
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2. The Operation
General M. A. Purkayev commanded the Second Far Eastern Front
in 1945. His general plan of attack was to deploy in three separate sectors
and achieve three separate axes of advance: [Ref. 98:pp. 149-150]




Figure 14. Operational Plan of the Second Far Eastern Front
[Ref. 100:p. 30j
Main Operational Axis; 15th Army cross the Amur and Ussuri rivers.
Advance and unite with forces from the First Far Eastern Front.
Supporting Axis; Second Army conduct supporting attack and advance
south through Lesser Khingan Mountains.
- Supporting Axis; Fifth Rifle Corps attack across Ussuri to seize Jaoho
then unite with the 35th Army of the First Far Eastern Front.
- Amur Flotilla; Cooperate with all armies to coordinate crossings of
Amur and Ussuri.
General Purkayev issued the following order to Lt. General S. K.
Mamonov, commander of the Soviet 1 5th Army:
In cooperation with two brigades of the Amur Flotilla, 15th Army will
force the Amur River in the region of the mouth of the Sungari River,
destroy the enemy defending the Sugarian and Fuchin Fortified Regions,
and subsequently advance on Fuchin with the main force on the east bank
of the Sungari. Then develop the offensive in the direction of Chiamussu
and Harbin. A portion of the Army forces will defend a 240 kilometer
section of the front. [Ref. 99:p. 181]
Mamonov's plan developed the main axis of attack along the
Sungari river. The 361st and 388th Rifle Divisions would cross the Amur river
supported by the 1st Brigade of the Amur Flotilla. This crossing would take
place in the Leninskoye and Voskresenskoye sectors. The 1st Brigade would
then remain in area to further aid amphibious crossings of the Amur. The
2nd Brigade of the Amur Flotilla was to transport the 630th Rifle Regiment
across the Amur from Nizhe-Spasskoye. [Ref. 99:pp. 181- 185]
General Mamonov established a joint command post for the 15th
Army and Amur Flotilla at Leninskoye. An alternative floating command
post was then deployed along with a mobile naval repair facility on the
Amur river. On 8 August, the 1st Brigade of the Amur Flotilla deployed to
Leninskoye and the 2nd Brigade deployed to Nizhe-Spasskoye. All was
made ready for the impending attack. [Ref. 99:p. 185]
The attack began at 0100 on August 9. The 1st Brigade supported
the amphibious assault of Tartar island on the 9th. For two days, the 1st
Brigade struggled to ferry sufficient supplies for advancing Soviet ground
forces across the Sungari. Soviet steamships and Army pontoon units
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assisted to speed the crossing. On August 10, Gen. Mamonov ordered the
1st Brigade to support the seizure of Fuchin which was then achieved by the
morning of the 1 1th. [Ref. 99:pp. 185-191]
The 2nd Brigade assaulted Fuyuan in the initial assault on August 9.
After Fuyuan fell, the 2nd Brigade along with the 630th Rifle Regiment
systematically secured the cities of Chinteli, Otu and Kaintsi. Between
August 10 and 13, the 2nd Brigade ferried supporting forces across the
AmuratLeninskoye. [Ref. 99:pp. 194-194]
On August 13, Gen. Mamonov ordered the 1st and 2nd Brigade to
form up for an assault on Japanese forces at Chiamussu. With the 1st
Brigade landing the first echelon assault and the 2nd Brigade following with
the main assault group, Chiamussu fell to the Soviets by the end of August
14. [Ref. 99:pp. 194-195] Sanhsing and Harpin surrendered by August 20
[Ref. 100:p. 32].
5. Soviet Analysis
This operation is an example of how detailed Soviet planning
responds to success. When battlefield conditions are anticipated and Soviet
forces rapidly achieve their missions, the operation gains momentum. Rear
Admiral Devyaterikov describes the actions of the Amur Flotilla in a 1985
Morskoy Sbornik article. He finds no fault with the combat action. He
argues that the Flotilla cooperated well with the Soviet ground forces. In
fact, according to Devyaterikov the operation would not have been possible
without the participation of the Amur Flotilla. Ships of the Flotilla provided
rapid transit to all key Japanese defensive positions as well as making
maneuver possible in flooded and swampy terrain. [Ref. 100:pp. 29-33]
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C. THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE NAVAL OPERATION
These historical cases are not intended to provide an objective historical
record of events. Instead, they are developed from Soviet sources in order
to describe how they view the historical employment of naval forces. It is
said that the Soviet Navy can conduct both independent and combined
operations. How did these operations fit into the conduct of World War II?
The Soviet Baltic Fleet anti-SLOC operation was an independent
operation. It was carried out concurrent with the German siege of
Leningrad and the conduct of Soviet and German ground operations. This is
not to say that the operation was unaffected by the conduct of war in the
Baltic States. Quite the contrary, all the major warships of the Baltic Fleet
were assigned to the defense of Leningrad. They essentially became
artillery units. Baltic Fleet aviation units were diverted from supporting
deployed submarines in order to carry out missions in support of Soviet
ground troops. Yet, the conduct of the anti-SLOC operation remained
independent and proceeded at its own pace.
The coordination of the 15th Army and the Amur Flotilla was a
combined action within the Second Front's Manchurian operation. As such,
it is comparable to a combined operation. Here naval forces were
subordinated at all levels to ground unit commanders. The commander of
the 15th Army took operational control of the Amur Flotilla. Army division
commanders took control of the Amur Flotilla brigades. The Amur Flotilla
essentially fulfilled the role of a combat support unit.
This does not mean that the Soviets do not view the naval contribution
to be important. They clearly state that the 15th Army's assault could not
81
have been successful without the aid of the Amur Flotilla. It does suggest,
though, that the Soviet's view naval forces as a means of overcoming water
obstacles in a ground operation. When the water obstacle is large, then an
amphibious operation is called for. When the water obstacle is small, river
Flotillas or Army pontoon units will suffice.
The actions of the Amur Flotilla also suggest that the pace of the naval
action is directly tied to the conduct of the ground action in a combined
operation. The independent Baltic Fleet operation lasted six months. The
Amur Flotilla support lasted only 1 1 days.
There are several limiting factors in drawing conclusions on the Soviet
view of naval operations today. The primary complicating factor is the
introduction of nuclear weapons onto the modern battlefield. Also very
important are improvements made in communications, reconnaissance and
intelligence collection, aircraft and missile technology. In addition, the
Soviet Navy is much larger and more capable than it was in World War II.
The tasks assigned to the Soviet Navy have changed as naval technology
has advanced. In the book, Soviet Naval Operations of the Great Patriotic
War 1941-1945 , the Soviet Navy is portrayed as having conducted or
participated in : [Ref. 6]
- Amphibious Operations;
- Anti-amphibious Operations;
- Defense of SLOCs;
- Anti-SLOC Operations,
- Defense of Naval Bases;
- Artillery Support of Ground Forces; and
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- Establishment of Defensive Minefields.
Of these operations, only the SLOC, anti-SLOC and minefield operations
were conducted independently. All others were conducted as combined
operations.
Naval analysts Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till suggest that in 1954, the
Soviet Navy began to view the primary naval threat as surprise nuclear
attack by NATO aircraft carriers. This was followed by the Western
deployment of ballistic missile submarines beginning in 1960. [Ref. 101 :p.
94] As these new naval threats emerged, the independent missions assigned
to the Soviet Navy grew to include anti-carrier operations, anti-SSBN
operations and operations against enemy ASW forces.
The Soviet view on the employment of naval force has certainly evolved
since World War II. There are indications, however, that the basic Soviet
view of the naval operation may not have changed. For example, the
employment of the Soviet Navy is still confined to independent and
combined operations. Also, Soviet naval articles continue to portray
operations from World War II as examples of the employment of the
principles of military art.
If this is true, then the Soviet view of the modern battlefield still
envisions the war as being conducted within a wide swath of land generally
referred to as the front. Combat actions which are conducted in proximity
to the front are integrated into Soviet combined-arms operations. This
places all combat action in the front area under the firm control of the
Soviet Army. Operations which are conducted outside of the front area are
viewed as independent operations. These independent operations, while
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important, are viewed as combat actions separated from the front both in
space and time.
8
V. EXPLORATIONS INTO SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONAL ART
The scientific structure of Soviet military science creates tremendous
opportunities for students of Soviet naval art. Soviet concepts of military
organization, planning and combat extend vertically through the somewhat
artificial constructs of strategy, operational art and tactics as well as
horizontally across the services of the Soviet Armed Forces. The existence of
a strong unified Soviet military strategy embodied as it is in the Soviet High
Command and General Staff ensures that these vertical and horizontal
linkages remain strong.
An analyst should take advantage of this rigid theoretical framework
and look both horizontally and vertically for information to fill gaps in his or
her knowledge of Soviet naval affairs. While probing into the uncharted
waters of Soviet naval operational art, one must often draw preliminary
conclusions on the basis of scant information. An unprepared analyst might
be tempted to continually ask the question, "How would I resolve this
problem if I were a Soviet commander?" This type of analysis is called mirror
imaging. A better method of approach is to carefully extrapolate Soviet
ideas along these horizontal and vertical links. This way preliminary
conclusions will be based upon Soviet ideas rather than being biased by the
perceptions of the individual analyst. This raw product can then be refined
as new information comes to light on the subject under study.
To illustrate this point consider the question of how a Soviet naval staff
would establish a communications network to support a naval operation.
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Given the limited amount of information available on communications in
Soviet naval literature, the analyst should begin to look elsewhere for
examples of Soviet communications structures. Figure 15. shows how a
Soviet motorized rifle battalion (MRB) organizes its communications in the
field.
In order to begin the extrapolation, the sample data is first reduced to
the basic principles which govern its construction. In the case of the MRB
communications network, several features stand out.
- Vertical lines in the net represent organizational entities and horizontal
lines represent inter-organizational radio communications.
- Two general types of communications are designated networks. First,
there are command nets where senior echelon commanders maintain
communications with their subordinates. Second, there are combat
support nets to facilitate the dissemination of coordination, technical
support, etc.
- The Chief of Staff of the senior echelons monitors the communications
of his commander.
- Supporting combat arms (i.e., the artillery battalion) provides
coordination at the senior echelon level, then directs the activities of its
subordinate forces on separate nets.
- Reconnaissance, although technically a combat support service, is given
special importance. It feeds battlefield information directly to the
senior commander.
Using these basic characteristics, the analyst can then postulate a Soviet
communications net for the conduct of a Soviet naval operation. The
determining factor in constructing the communication net is identifying the
organizational structure of the Soviet naval forces.
Consider the following scenario. The Soviet Pacific Fleet commander is





























CVNs. The Pacific Fleet commander's operation plan forms a detached
flotilla consisting of two air supplemented anti-carrier warfare (ACW) task
forces each consisting of:[Ref. 102]
- One bomber Unit (20 Aircraft with Fighter Escort);
- One CGN, CG, or major DDG;
-TwoDDG, FFG.DD, FF;
-OneSSGNorSSG; and
- Two SSN or SS.
The organizational structure of such an operation would have to
support the echelonment of command from the Soviet Pacific Fleet to the
ACW Task Force commanders. This structure would also have to include the
support provided by the combat arms of Soviet Pacific Fleet submarines and
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Figure 1 6. rga ni;national Structure of the ACW Operation
This basic structure makes it possible to construct a communications net
based upon the characteristics discovered in the MRB network. Figure 17.
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With this "straw man" communications network, it is now possible to
look for information which will refine the extrapolation. Admiral
Navoytsev's comments noted earlier in the discussion on coordination imply
that control of Soviet submarines is atypical because of unique problems in
submarine communications [Ref. 31:pp. 22-23]. Review of the MED
definition for "submarine screen" provides further evidence of a needed
change in the extrapolated communication structure:
Mode of group employment of submarines, consisting in their
regulated deployment on the enemy's route of movement, ensuring
maximum probability of his detection (destruction). Elements are
specified (coordinates of screen center, formation, spacings between
submarines, runninq depth, heading, duration of tack, etc.), which ensure
proper formation, formation change, and coordinated maneuvering by
the submarines. Lack of mutual communication among submarines
submerged is a specific feature of the submarine screen. Control of each
boat is effected from the fleet command center. {Emphasis added} [Ref.
103]
This new information facilitates refinement of the "straw man" fleet
communications network. The submarine communications portion of the
net is altered so that each submarine is controlled directly from the fleet
level. With that adjustment made, the fleet communications net for the
proposed operation would appear as in Figure 18.
Thinking in terms of extrapolation can help the analyst phrase
questions to more productively guide his or her research. For example, a
current question regarding Soviet naval operational art asks what the new
Soviet term, combined-fleet operation (obshaflotskaya operatsiya), means.
This term has appeared only in the 1983 MED and has not been
subsequently described in the journal Morskoy Sbornik [Ref. 104]. How can
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First, the following information is provided by the MED in its description
of combined-fleet operations. [Ref. 104]
- This operation is conducted by combining the actions of several
branches of service, combat arms and special troops. Specifically, by
actions of fleets and flotillas of different force organizations.
- The combined-fleet operation requires establishment of its own
command authority.
- The operation seeks to accomplish a large aggregate of interlinked
strategic and operational missions of different types.
Since the definition for combined-fleet operations is combined within
the citation for combined-arms operations, a strong conceptual link exists
between the two [Ref. 104]. The next step is to identify characteristics of
Soviet combined-arms operations which then can be extrapolated to the
Soviet Navy.
The Soviet combined-arms operation is a complex form of operation.
The definitions of both independent [Ref. 18] and combined operations
[Ref. 20] list themselves as components of the combined-arms system of
warfare. The SME definition of independent operations suggests that
ground warfare contains characteristics which prevent the Soviet Army from
conducting independent operations. This definition states that only the
Soviet Navy, Air Force and Air Defense Force can conduct independent
operations [Ref. 18]. The interesting questions now become:
- What prevents the Soviet Army from conducting independent
operations?
- What has changed which requires the Soviet Navy to consider
conducting combined-fleet operations?
To answer the first question, examine the independent operations
which the Soviet Navy has been assigned. For example, consider the anti-
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ASW operation. Could the Soviet Army conduct a similar operation on land,
i.e., some sort of operation to destroy enemy anti-tank units? No, the Soviet
Army cannot form a grouping for that singular task because so many other
tasks must be performed in the same block of space and time. The Soviet
Navy can conduct independent operations precisely because, heretofore,
naval groupings could be formed to achieve a single task within a block of
space and time.
By shifting this line of logic to the Soviet Navy, the significance of the
second question now becomes apparent. In the Soviet view, the naval
environment is changing somehow such that the pursuit of one task (ACW,
ASW, SLOC interdiction, etc.) will conflict with each other within the zones
defined for naval operations. Since the shift is not due to a physical or
geographical change, the only remaining possibility is that the technological
or material base of naval warfare is somehow changing the naval combat
environment.
There is no topic which has fired the imagination of Soviet military
authors more than the developing technology of "reconnaissance-strike"
weapon systems. Reconnaissance-strike (recce-strike) weapon systems
combine the functions of reconnaissance, guidance, data collection and
analysis and strike with automated communications. The Soviet Navy
considers both the U.S. Tomahawk and Harpoon missile systems as recce-
strike weapons, especially when they are augmented with the
reconnaissance capabilities of a U.S. E-2 Hawkeye carrier based aircraft.
These weapons systems are attributed with the destructive power of tactical
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nuclear weapons and, therefore, in quantity are expected to cause a
qualitative shift in the character of modern warfare. [Ref. 105:pp. 20-26]
The Soviets note the following as the effects of introducing recce-strike
systems into the naval combat environment: [Ref. 105:pp. 20-26]
- The destructive capabilities of individual strikes will increase
dramatically.
- The automated control centers which support these weapons system
will be deployed near the command posts of tactical commanders,
preferable on airborne platforms.
- The high precision and long range of these weapon systems will cause
the size of strike groups to decrease and the number of groups to
increase.
- The scope of naval battle will increase to the scale of the reconnaissance
system which will cause operational commanders to play an important
role in the direction of tactical actions (primarily strike).
This Soviet description of a changing naval environment dovetails nicely
with the creation of the combined-fleet operation. On one hand, the Soviet
Navy must counter an increasingly threatening enemy navy with dispersed
formations of small strike groups. The Soviet operational commander will
have to combine the tasks of protecting Soviet forces, destroy enemy forces
and prevent the enemy's nuclear attack into a single operational plan and
command structure. For example, as more and more U.S. submarines are
equipped with TOMAHAWK cruise missiles, the Soviet operational
commander must combine the tasks of protecting the Soviet homeland form
nuclear attack with protection of Soviet SSBNs. The increased complexity of
these tasks require the Soviets to construct increasingly complex naval
operations, such as the combined-fleet operations.
On the other hand, the Soviet operational commander will also be
employing weapons with increased recce-strike capability. The creation of a
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combined- fleet operation will expand the responsibility of the Soviet naval
commander to include the accomplishment of all strategic and operational
tasks within range of his reconnaissance systems.
The combined-fleet operation does not yet exist. The recce-strike
weapon systems have not yet revolutionized warfare at sea. According to
Soviet dialectical reasoning, recce-strike systems must first accumulate in
sufficient quantity before they can cause a qualitative shift in the character
of warfare. If the Soviets believe that this time is approaching, then they
will take steps today to prepare for the future of naval warfare. What
indications are present today?
First and foremost, the Soviet Navy has laid the keels for two nuclear
powered aircraft carriers. [Ref. 106:p. 165] This represents a significant
change in the pattern of Soviet naval construction whose only previous
seaborne fixed-wing aircraft were vertical take-off and landing (VTOL). The
new Soviet carrier could be the center of the combined-fleet operation by
allowing the seaborne deployment of sophisticated airborne reconnaissance
platforms in close proximity to intended zones of naval operations.
The second type of Soviet warship currently under construction is the
KIROV class nuclear powered cruiser. This ship is heavily leaden with
modern Soviet missiles, and as such could well be intended to supply the
missiles necessary in any recce-strike system. In addition, the KIROV class
possesses extensive communications facilities and therefore may also serve
as a command post for the combined-fleet operation. [Ref. 106:pp 172-173]
The SLAVA guided missile cruiser is a third Soviet warship currently
under construction. Again, this is a weapons platform well supplied with
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modern missiles. These ships have been constructed concurrent with the
KIROV class. They also can fulfill the role of delivering the necessary missiles
to the zone of naval operations. [Ref. 106:p. 176]
Extrapolations which focuses solely on the scientific and logical
structure of Soviet naval operational art tend to overlook important non-
structural factors. For instance, Edward L. Keenan in an article titled,
"Muscovite Political Folkways," describes cultural traits which Russian
peasants developed in order to survive in a hostile environment [Ref.
107:pp. 115-181]. The majority of the Soviet officer corps is Russian. How
might these Russian characteristics influence the conduct of naval
operations?
Keenan lists several Russian traits which might be useful in this
investigation: [Ref. 107:pp. 1 19-128]
- A strong urge to maintain stability and order in his world;
- Avoidance of risk;
- Secretiveness, a mutually protective silence;
- Suppression of individual initiatives;
- The search for unanimous resolution of important issues; and
- A tendency to reward success and punish failure.
These Russian traits can be systematically compared with both the
theoretical principles of naval operational art and the activities of Soviet
naval planning.
For example, the Russian dependence upon consensual decision-making
imbues the naval operational plan with special importance. The operational
plan represents a consensus reached by the General Staff and the naval fleet
I!
staff on how to conduct the operation. To deviate from the plan, a Russian
naval officer would have to assume personal responsibility for opposing a
unanimous decision concluded by many officers his senior.
This line of reasoning can be combined with the Russian application of
initiative. The Soviet principles of military art urge the Russian naval officer
to use initiative when changing circumstances require it and consultation is
impossible. Yet, Russian cultural tradition frowns upon the exercise of
individual initiative. The operational plan guides the Russian naval officer
through this difficult decision by expressing the desires of his operational
commander. As long an the basic concept of the plan remains sound, the
Russian naval officer is able to exercise initiative in changing various details
of the plan. If the concept of the plan no longer corresponds to the combat
situation, then the Russian officer will experience difficulty in reaching a
decision on whattodo.
These techniques of extrapolation and cultural investigation present
only coarse pictures of Soviet naval operational art. As new information
comes to light, the clarity and resolution of these pictures will improve.
Keep in mind that each method of research biases its product. Extrapolation
avoids mirror imaging, but is still vulnerable to the subjective conclusions of
the analyst. Cultural investigations highlight long term cultural trends, but
overlook important recent developments. It is by combining diverse
research methods that bias is overcome. All things considered, this research
has found that both extrapolation and cultural investigation provide
interesting and creative tools for exploring Soviet naval operational art.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Soviet naval operational art is not a topic often addressed in books and
articles discussing the Soviet Navy. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet
Navy has been steadily growing into a large and capable naval force which
has become a serious maritime threat to the interests of the United States,
its friends and allies. In recognition of this threat, many researchers have
addressed themselves to questions concerning Soviet strategy and naval
tactics. An understanding of the Soviet Navy, however, will never fully be
realized until the Soviet theory of naval operational art is examined.
The Soviet Union divides the spectrum of armed conflict into strategy,
operational art and tactics. Soviet strategy translates the political goals of
the CPSU into military tasks to be completed by the military forces of the
Soviet Union. These tasks can only be accomplished by the successful
conduct of battle, both on land and at sea. The preparation for and
execution of these battles is the responsibility of Soviet tactics. According to
Soviet authors, the size and sophistication of the world's armed forces have
grown such that single battles cannot achieve strategic tasks. The Soviet
theory of operational art develops operations which organize the conduct
of a sequence of battles. These operations ensure that the missions assigned
by the strategic leadership of the Soviet Union are completed.
The artificial constructs of strategy, operational art and tactics are
visualized by Soviet military officers as blocks of space and time. Battles are
conducted in small boxes whose boundaries are defined by the size of the
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geographical area which can be contested by Soviet tactical commanders
and the endurance of Soviet tactical formations. Operations are conducted
in boxes large enough to contain the battles necessary to achieve the
assigned strategic missions. The plans for strategic employment of Soviet
forces (strategic operations) are designed in boxes which represent areas
known in the West as Theaters of Strategic Military Action (TSMA).
The Soviet Navy does not possess a naval strategy. Instead, Soviet naval
forces are instruments of a unified military strategy. The Soviet Navy,
however, does possess a naval theory of operational art and tactics. Naval
operations may be either independent or combined. Soviet naval
commanders exercise the most control over the conduct of independent
naval operations.
Soviet naval operational art is profoundly affected by the views of
Soviet military science and art. Soviet military science requires naval
operations to be based upon the Laws of Armed Conflict. These laws are
believed to statistically determine the outcome of battles, operations and
wars. Soviet military art develops these laws into the principles of military
art. These principles interpret how the Laws of Armed Conflict should be
applied in the contemporary combat environment. As new technologies
change the environment of combat, the principles of military art also
change.
The theoretical basis of the Soviet naval operational art is founded
upon elucidation of how the principles apply to the naval combat
environment. This process can be thought of as occurring in two stages.
First, the principles of military art are applied to the conduct of military
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operations. The resulting operational principles are then examined in the
environment of naval combat. The Soviet theory of naval operational art is
a synthesis of these general, operational and naval characteristics.
Several unique characteristics influence the conduct of Soviet naval
operations. Soviet naval theory does not propose to use naval forces to
seize control of oceanic territory. Soviet naval forces primarily concentrate
on the destruction of enemy naval formations. In Western parlance, this
would be called a theory of sea denial. Soviet naval theory also requires that
the employment of diverse naval forces in order to maximize their combat
effect through the use of coordination. This coordination takes place
simultaneously on land, at sea, underwater and in the air.
The principles of combat readiness, surprise, coordination and
maneuver hold special meaning for the Soviet Navy. Combat readiness
describes the Soviet Navy's capability to complete combat missions within
specified time periods. Naval surprise relies heavily on the employment of
radioelectronic combat (electronic warfare) and naval reconnaissance.
Maneuver describes both the agility of forces in combat and their ability to
strike enemy formations in depth.
Soviet troop control fashions these theoretical concepts into naval
operations. The same basic system of planning appears to be used by all
Soviet military services. In particular, the operational planning of the Soviet
Navy differs only slightly from that employed in combined-arms operations.
The primary difference is in the correlation of forces and means. In the
organization of coordination and operational support (i.e., reconnaissance,
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deception, logistic support, etc.) combined-arms and naval planning seem to
be identical.
The presence of nuclear weapons at sea greatly affects the conduct of
Soviet naval operations. Soviet naval operations are not characterized as
either conventional or nuclear. The strategic missions assigned naval forces
must be achieved whether or not nuclear weapons are used. As a result,
Soviet naval operations combine the planning of nuclear and non-nuclear
battles into a single operational plan. The Soviet fleet commander monitors
both a conventional and nuclear correlation of forces and means. The
conventional correlation measures the current ability of Soviet naval forces
to achieve their missions. The nuclear correlation continually measures the
outcome of a nuclear escalation. The Soviet fleet commander appears to
design his operations in order to reflect both the conventional and nuclear
correlation of forces.
Soviet descriptions of naval operations in World War II provide insight
into the Soviet view of independent and combined naval operations. The
Soviets tend to picture the ground front as the decisive locale for the
conduct of war. Military operations can either contribute directly or
indirectly to frontline operations. Independent naval operations indirectly
support the advancement of the front. Independent operations are
geographically displaced from the front and proceed at their own pace.
Combined operations directly support the war at the front and have a
completely different character. When naval forces support ground forces,
the operation proceeds on a time schedule appropriate for ground
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operations. Naval forces essentially provide a means to overcome water
obstacles.
The fact that the Soviet Navy has greatly expanded since World War II
suggests that the importance of independent naval operations has also
grown. The strategic leadership of the Soviet Union appears to place great
emphasis on destroying enemy aircraft carriers, ASW forces and SSBNs. Yet,
despite this increased emphasis on the independent naval operation, Soviet
naval operations are still viewed as either contributing directly or indirectly
to the conduct of the war at the front.
In looking to the future, the Soviet Navy may be taking on a new role.
The advance of new weapon technologies called reconnaissance-strike
(recce-strike) weapons appears to be steering the Soviet Navy toward the
development of a new combined-fleet operation. These new recce-strike
weapons (Harpoon, Tomahawk, precision guided munitions, etc) greatly
complicate the achievement of Soviet independent naval operations.
Currently, Soviet naval operations are specially designed to achieve specific
missions (i.e., ASW, ACW, etc.). The future Soviet combined-fleet operation
expects to coordinate the accomplishment of several strategic missions
within a single zone of the ocean.
This future combined-fleet operation has already influenced Soviet
naval construction programs. The new Soviet aircraft carrier, KIROV and
SLAVA are well suited to form the core of a combined-fleet formation. By
combining aerial reconnaissance, sophisticated control centers and modern
recce-strike weapons, this combined-fleet formation would enable to
1
i
Soviets to establish significant sea control areas. This may actually involve a
conceptual extension of the front out to sea.
These glimpses into Soviet naval operational art suggest several
exploitable opportunities. For example/the stable and systematic structure
of the Soviet theory of naval operational art presents opportunities for long
term competition with the Soviet Navy. The creation of centralized
planning and control elements at the operational level slow down the
Soviet process of translating strategic tasks into tactical missions. The U.S.
naval tactical on-scene commander is best suited to take advantage of this
fact. The Soviet tactical commander must continually transmit information
back to an operational level for guidance. If the U.S. tactical commander is
given the information necessary to make comparable decision at the scene,
he will react to the changing naval combat environment more quickly and
therefore more effectively than his Soviet opponent.
This advantage is multiplied when one considers the distortion which
normally occurs when situational data is transmitted in war. The Soviet
tactical commander must send off information and wait for a reply. The U.S.
tactical commander need only receive information then make his decision.
Opportunities also exist in peacetime. The Soviet system of military
science possesses a well defined internal logic. Seemingly inexplicable
Soviet actions can be explained by revealing this internal logic. U.S. naval
officers can work to expand their knowledge of the Soviet system of naval
operational art. This knowledge will serve to aid naval officers in
anticipating the actions of the Soviet Navy.
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Failure to study the Soviet theory of naval operational art will result in
lost opportunities. The Soviet combination of nuclear and conventional
warfighting does not become important until one gains an appreciation for
Soviet operational art. The Soviet combined-fleet operation makes no sense
unless one understands the difference between independent and
combined-arms operations. This thesis hopes to increase discussion within
the U.S. Navy on the topic of Soviet naval operational art. As the Soviet
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